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DRUGI POTOP: THE FALL OF THE SECOND POLISH REPUBLIC 
by 
Wesley Kent 
(Under the Direction of John W. Steinberg) 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to examine the factors that resulted in the fall of the Second 
Polish Republic and track its downward trajectory.  Examining the Second Republic, 
from its creation in 1918 to its loss of recognition in 1945, reveals that its demise began 
long before German tanks violated Poland’s frontiers on 1 September, 1939. 
Commencing with the competing ideas of what a Polish state would be and continuing 
through the political and foreign policy developments of the inter-war years, a pattern 
begins to emerge - that of the Poles’ search for their place in modern Europe. The lead up 
to the Second World War and the invasion of Poland by the German-Soviet Alliance 
demonstrates the failure of the Poles to achieve that place. The actions of the Polish 
Government-in-Exile during the war embody an attempt to legitimize their claims by 
lending all the support at their disposal to the Allied war effort. Yet the entry of the 
Soviet Union into the Allied cause proved a death sentence for the Second Republic, 
despite the Poles contributions they paled in comparison to those of the USSR. The 
London Poles defense of their national territory and people in the face of Soviet demand 
aggravated the Western Allies, causing them to see the government-in-exile as 
uncooperative and therefore, inconvenient. Due to this, when the time came they were 
willing to sacrifice the London Poles to appease Stalin and ensure his continued pledge to 
inter-allied unity. The Second Republic emerges from this examination as a victim of the 
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circumstances of its time and place. From the beginning the Poles were fighting a losing 
battle to regain the position they had lost in the 17th century. In the end, despite their 
resistance to Germans and Soviets alike, they were resigned by the Western powers to be 
a Soviet puppet state for the next 50 years. 
INDEX WORDS: Poland, USSR, Germany, The United Kingdom, The United States of 
America, France, The Second Polish Republic, The Polish Government-in-Exile, World 
War II, Katyn, Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, The Warsaw Uprising, The Teheran 
Conference, The Yalta Conference, The Potsdam Conference, Jozef Pilsudski, Joseph 
Stalin, Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt 
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   INTRODUCTION 
The Polish Second Republic 
  
The Second Polish Republic was forged in the dying embers of the First World War; the 
Polish people, sensing the demise of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires, 
reversed over a century of foreign occupation and established an independent Polish nation in 
1918. Tragically, the Second Republic was born into a geopolitically hopeless situation; its very 
existence in Europe reliant on factors seemingly outside of its control. The new Poland arose 
between the two wounded giants of Germany and Soviet Russia, and its subsequent survival 
rested almost entirely on the fallacy of these two nations remaining in their weakened state. The 
politics and foreign policy of the Second Republic mirrored the Poles view of themselves as a 
reborn great power in the vein of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of the 16th century, a 
delusion which blinded them to their true weakness. Europe’s rejection of Poland’s worldview 
resulted in the Poles attempting, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, to find their place in Europe 
and gain legitimacy both at home and abroad.  
Their precarious position in Europe and inexperience with democracy resulted in the 
Republics fall into authoritarianism damaging it prestige in the eyes of the West. In foreign 
policy, they were unable to find their place in the European power structure due to the threat they 
represented to its balance of power. When attempting to negotiate with Germany or the USSR, 
Poland’s 1000 year struggle against the two nations produced a mindset where the very idea of 
compromise with either power was equated with weakness and national betrayal. Therefore any 
Polish territorial concession, a prerequisite for alliance with either Germany or the USSR, 
represented submission to foreign domination. The Polish solution of forming alliances with the 
appeasing West, throughout the inter-war years, compounded their problems. This left the Poles 
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vulnerable and isolated between the growing power of their neighbors. Polish security was, 
therefore, built on illusions: that of their strength in comparison to Germany and the USSR and 
that of their importance to the West. Though the Second Republic’s standing in Europe was 
tenuous at its foundation, as time went by, while Germany rearmed and the USSR industrialized, 
its position became less and less secure. The West, simultaneously, began distancing itself from 
the Poles, eager to appease Hitler and prevent another great European war. Yet with the 
commencement of the Second World War, the Second Republic’s position in Europe became 
untenable. With renewed strength, Germany and the USSR stripped the Second Republic of its 
territory in September of 1939, forcing its government and military to flee abroad. The entry of 
the Soviet Union into the Allied war effort in June 1941 further weakened the Poles' alliances 
with the West. The problem of legitimacy, inherited by the Polish Government-in-Exile, was 
their greatest weakness, one that the Soviets and the Western Allies were able to exploit to 
unilaterally decide Poland’s post-war fate. Consequently, in the face of Soviet demands, 
Poland’s position in the Allied camp declined, until they were finally abandoned at the Yalta 
Conference in 1945; the Second Republic being sacrificed in the name of inter-Allied unity, a 
mirage destined to fall apart in the coming Cold War. 
This thesis seeks to examine the factors that resulted in the fall of the Second Polish 
Republic and track its downward trajectory.1
                                                 
1
 The historiography of the Polish Second Republic, available in English, can be divided into several major areas. 
For a general overview, Gods Playground by Norman Davies is the definitive work, describing the history 
of Poland from antiquity to the present day. The Eagle Unbowed, by Halik Kochanski, is a comprehensive 
survey of Poland in the Second World War, touching on everything from diplomacy to economics, the 
Polish Armed forces to the three great conferences, and the government-in-exile to the German death 
camps 
 Examining the Second Republic, from its creation 
The Soviets’ role in the formation of the Second Republic is explored in White Eagle, Red Star: The 
Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20, by Norman Davies, which describes the military and political events surrounding the 
Polish-Soviet War. Another work is Soviet-Polish Relations, 1917-1921, by Piotr Wandycz, which, conversely, 
focuses on the diplomatic battles between the Poles and the Soviets during the same period. 
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in 1918 to its loss of recognition in 1945, reveals that its demise began long before German tanks 
violated Poland’s frontiers on 1 September, 1939. Commencing with the competing ideas of 
what a Polish state would be and continuing through the political and foreign policy 
developments of the inter-war years, a pattern begins to emerge - that of the Poles’ search for 
their place in modern Europe. The lead up to the Second World War and the invasion of Poland 
by the German-Soviet Alliance demonstrates the failure of the Poles to achieve that place. The 
                                                                                                                                                             
The internal fragmentation of the Second Republic’s politics is explored by Joseph Rothschild in his two 
works, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état and East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars. Within, Rothschild 
chronicles the rise and fall of the Poles’ parliamentary democracy, and its overturning by Joseph Pilsudski’s coup in 
May of 1926. Politics in Independent Poland 1921-1939, by Antony Polonsky, also focuses on the inter-war politics 
of the Second Republic, showing the failure of the various governments to solidify their power enough to raise 
Poland into a position of strength.  
Poland’s diplomacy with its Western allies is the subject of two books by Anna Cienciala. In From 
Versailles to Locarno, co-written with Titus Komarnicki, Cienciala describes the origins of the Poles’ alliances with 
France and the French’s subsequent retreat for this alliance due to pressure exerted by the United Kingdom. 
Cienciala’s second book, Poland and the Western Powers 1938-1939, examines Poland’s foreign policy in the lead-
up to the Second World War and the failure of both the Poles’ policy of equilibrium and their Western alliances.    
The suffering of the Polish people during the Second World War and German-Soviet crimes against Polish 
citizens is the subject of numerous works. Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, by Timothy Snyder, looks 
at the history of the Eastern European borderlands from the end of World War One through the Second World War. 
Snyder recounts the seemingly never-ending pattern of slaughter committed by the Germans and Soviets on not only 
Poles, but also Jews, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and others. Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and 
Atrocity, by Alexander Rossino, inspects the savage conduct of the German war machine during the 
September,1939, campaign and shows how German actions in Poland were in many ways a test run for their future 
crimes in the USSR. Katyn: A Crime without Punishment, by Anna Cienciala, N. S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech 
Materski, provides a wealth of primary documents and analyses of the Katyn massacre of 20,000 Polish officers and 
Intelligentsia at the hands of the NKVD in 1940. Looking at the course of the massacre from the Soviet invasion of 
Poland to the Russian government’s confession in the 1990s, Cienciala seeks to explain the reasons for the Soviets’ 
actions. 
Poland’s military contribution to the Allied cause in the Second World War is explored in No Greater Ally 
by Kenneth Koskodan. In his work, Koskodan recounts in detail the stories of the various Polish Armed Forces 
active against the Germans in Europe. Rising ’44, by Norman Davies, is an overview of the Warsaw Uprising of 
1944. Davies follows the course of the uprising from its outbreak to its eventual defeat, focusing primarily on the 
life of the resistance fighters, the Soviets’ disregard for the uprising, and the Western Allies’ refusal to press Stalin 
to aid the Poles. 
The Polish Government-in-Exiles’ struggles against Soviet demands and Western pressure to compromise 
is the focus of Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, by Edward Raczyński and Stanisław Biegański. 
An English translation of many of the government-in-exiles documents from the Second World War, the collection 
is a record of the London Poles’ opposition to Soviet demands. In Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland, 
Edward Rozek describes the Soviets’ attempts to gain political control of Poland through diplomacy with the 
Western Allies. Rozek argues that control of Poland was one of the Soviet Union’s earliest goals and that they used 
war with Hitler to gain control of all of Eastern Europe. Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin, by Herbert Feis, looks at the 
inner diplomacy of the leaders of the three great powers as they decided the shape of the post-war world. Feis’ work 
shows how important the Red Army was to the allied cause and how much the West was willing to give to ensure 
continued Soviet involvement in the war against Hitler.  
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actions of the Polish Government-in-Exile during the war embody an attempt to legitimize their 
claims by lending all the support at their disposal to the Allied war effort. Yet the entry of the 
Soviet Union into the Allied cause proved a death sentence for the Second Republic, despite the 
Poles contributions they paled in comparison to those of the USSR. The London Poles defense of 
their national territory and people in the face of Soviet demand aggravated the Western Allies, 
causing them to see the government-in-exile as uncooperative and therefore, inconvenient. Due 
to this, when the time came they were willing to sacrifice the London Poles to appease Stalin and 
ensure his continued pledge to inter-allied unity. The Second Republic emerges from this 
examination as a victim of the circumstances of its time and place. From the beginning the Poles 
were fighting a losing battle to regain the position they had lost in the 17th century. In the end, 
despite their resistance to Germans and Soviets alike, they were resigned by the Western powers 
to be a Soviet puppet state for the next 50 years. 
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CHAPTER I 
The Stillborn Republic  
The Inter-War Years: 1918-1939 
 
Map 1. “Map of the Polish Second Republic: With Partition Borders” Ancestry.com. “
 http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~atpc/maps/poland-1918.gif,  (accessed April 1, 2013) 
 
The origins of the Second Republic’s fall lay long before the opening shots of World War 
II. The position in which the Polish state found itself after having won independence was not 
enviable. Established in the aftermath of the First World War, the Second Republic was forged 
from the remains of three empires, the German Kaiserreich, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and 
the Russian Empire, which had all collapsed as a result of the recent conflict. Reclaiming their 
independence after 123 years of foreign domination with a series of uprisings, declarations, and 
border skirmishes, the Polish people saw their creation gain international recognition at the 
Versailles Conference in 1919. With this independence, however, Weimar Germany and the 
USSR, the successor states of two of the three formerly partitioning powers, looked on hungrily, 
chafing at having so much of “their” former territory torn away from them. This hostility led to 
violence even before the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. In what is known as the Powstanie 
Wielkopolskie, Greater Poland Uprising, beginning on 27 December 1918 and ending on 15 
13 
 
 
February 1919, members of the Polska Organizacja Wojskowa, Polish Military Organization, 
many of whom were veterans of the First World War, engaged in armed conflict with the 
intention of driving the German occupation forces out of the areas of Poland occupied by 
Germany since the partitions at the end of the 18th century.2 Taking advantage of weakened 
German moral after the Kaiser’s forced abdication, and the armistice of 11 November, the Polish 
Military Organization pushed the German forces from Polish lands.3 The success of the uprising 
had far-reaching consequences at the Versailles Conference. The Versailles Treaty awarded the 
Poles not only the territory they had won through force of arms, but also territories still under 
dispute such as the Polish Corridor, the strip of land that gave Poland access to the Baltic.4
Most Polish leaders at the foundation of the Second Republic wished to create a large 
Polish state, to better protect and foster the economic, political, and military development of the 
fledgling nation. There were, however, competing aims on what shape the new Polish nation 
should take. Roman Dmowski, the leader of the right wing Narodowa Demokracja, National 
Democrat Party, argued for a compact homogeneous Poland made up only of the territory in 
which Polish Catholics were the majority.
 On 
their eastern border, things were not so simple.  
5 The ethnic minorities in these areas would be 
expelled or subject to “Polonization.6
                                                 
2
 Richard Blanke, Orphans of Versailles: the Germans in Western Poland, 1918-1939 (Lexington: University Press 
of Kentucky, 1993), 14-15. 
” The Polish leader and Chief of State Marshal Jozef 
3
 Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20 (London: Random House, 2003), 25-26. 
4
 Anna Cienciala and Titus Komarnicki, From Versailles to Locarno: Keys to Polish Foreign Policy, 1919-1925 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984), 53. 
5
 Norman Davies, God's Playground, a History of Poland: In Two Volumes: Volume II, 1795 to the Present. 
 (Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 2005), 55. 
6
 Antony Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland 1921-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 59. 
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Pilsudski alternatively argued for an Intermarium, between the seas, policy.7 He sought the 
establishment of a Polish-led, democratic, federation of independent states, in the vein of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: comprised of the Eastern European nations that were 
attempting to establish themselves after the collapse of the three great empires. Only through this 
form of collective security and the creation of a “Third Europe” axis could the eastern nations 
hope to stand against a future resurgent Germany or Russia.8
Pilsudski’s early implementation of his Intermarium policy and his attempts to expand 
Poland’s borders to their greatest size possible ran into the competing aims of the newly-born 
USSR. Having emerged victorious from the Russian Civil War, the Soviet government was wary 
of Polish expansion into areas formerly controlled by the Russian Empire, such as Ukraine, 
Belorussia, and the Baltic States. These areas had been ceded to Germany by the Bolsheviks at 
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to gain breathing space for their own consolidation of power.
  
9 That 
process completed, the Soviet government now looked to regain this lost territory. Additionally, 
many Soviet leaders, such as Leon Trotsky, were proponents of exporting the communist 
revolution to the rest of Europe, namely Germany. Poland was to be the bridge to the West.10 To 
achieve this, the Red Army would first have to make its way through the new Polish State. The 
intersection of Polish and Soviet expansion led to the Polish-Soviet War. Lasting from February, 
1919 to March, 1921, this back-and-forth struggle eventually saw the Poles emerge victorious, 
after the Battle of Warsaw (the so-called Miracle on the Vistula).11
                                                 
7
Davies, God's Playground, 55. 
 The Treaty of Riga signed 18 
8
 Anna M. Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers 1938-1939 (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1968), 6-
7.  
9
Davies, God's Playground, 284. 
10
 Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 66-67. 
11
 Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 223.  
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March 1921, secured some, but not all of the territory gained by the Poles in the east since the 
end of the First World War.12 Even with victory, the Polish-Soviet War ended Pilsudski’s hopes 
of an Intermarium federation. The Treaty of Riga left half of Ukraine and Belorussia, vital 
partners for the proposed federation, in Soviet hands. Simultaneous minor border conflicts with 
both Lithuania and Czechoslovakia poisoned relations between the three nations.13 Though 
Poland was able to maintain positive relations with the rest of Eastern Europe, the tensions these 
states had with their neighbors rendered it impossible for the establishment of any type of supra-
national federation. The Western powers also disapproved of the Intermarium policy due to its 
shifting of the European balance of power they were trying to maintain. While the eastern Polish 
borders, as set by the treaty of Riga, left Poland with a sizable ethnic minority of Ukrainians, 
Belarusians, and Jews, the failure of Intermarium led to a policy “Polonization” in the early 
years of the republic.14 In many ways a watered down version of Dmowski’s proposed policy of 
a distinct Polish state, became the de facto policy of the Polish government in the first half of the 
1920s.15
Polish politics during the inter-war period were marked by the search for an effective 
form of government. A conquered people for the past century the Poles would attempted to 
develop a functioning political entity to rule their nation. In many ways, however, two decades is 
not long enough to foster a spirit of democracy in a people long used to living under an 
autocracy. 
  
                                                 
12
 Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 261. 
13
  Matthew D'Auria, Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 1917-1957 ( New York: Berghahn 
Books,2012),191. 
14
 Davies, God's Playground, 272. 
15
 Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars (Seatle: University of Washington Press, 
1974), 34. 
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In 1921, the Poles adopted a constitution creating a government modeled on the French 
Republic with a strong legislative body, or Sejm, and a weak executive. The latter was an effort 
by Pilsudski’s enemies to prevent him from keeping the power he had possessed as chief of 
state.16
Due to the Sejm’s proportional representation, Polish politics fell prey to various 
fragmented factions, four major and numerous minor parties, each with their own constituents 
and ideologies that could not agree on any major issue.
 The government that emerged was chaotic and splintered. The problem of integrating the 
remnants of three empires into a single democratic body proved a difficult undertaking.  
17 As in the waning days of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth, the political infighting and division of the Sejm rendered it unable to 
adequately respond to the various problems facing the Polish nation. The numerous wars and 
conflicts had devastated much of the Polish territory and the difficulties of incorporating the 
three economic zones of the old empires into one was a daunting task.18 The political experience 
that many of the Polish politicians had gained while under foreign rule did nothing to aid their 
governance of the Second Republic. The Polish parties that had been formed in the legislative 
houses of Germany, Austria, and Russia had primarily been concerned with specifically Polish 
issues, such as redress for political grievances, and agitation for self-rule.19 Having gained 
independence, all their training proved useless and detrimental to the running of a cohesive state. 
The Sejm often devolved into special interests and demagoguery, and the grievances of Poland’s 
ethnic minorities were oft forgotten or ignored.20
                                                 
16
 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 45-46. 
 Corruption, resulting from a combination of 
political inexperience and heritage from Russia and Austria turned much of the populace away 
17
 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 96. 
18
 Davies, God's Playground, 307. 
19
 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 509-510. 
20
 Joseph Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966), 4. 
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from the very idea of a parliamentary system.21 The absences of Pilsudski from public political 
life, having declined to run for president owing to the weakness of the office, also served to 
foster a sense of illegitimacy in the Sejm amongst the common people. Pilsudski possessed a 
charisma and following unmatched in Poland due to his role in the establishment of the nation 
and his victory over the Soviets in 1920. His public withdrawal from politics after the 
assassination of the first elected President of Poland, Gabriel Narutowicz, further weakened 
public opinion of the Sejm government.22
From 1921 to 1925, Poland’s economy showed little sign of improving as unemployment 
and hyper-inflation remained rampant.
 
23 The continued corruption and ineffectiveness of the 
Sejm led to mass disillusionment with the government. In this political climate, many looked 
towards Pilsudski to use his connections in the military and left wing parties to launch a Coup 
against the Sejm.24 Pilsudski, disgusted with the inaction of the current government, was 
eventually persuaded and on 12-14 May 1926 with the support of the military, the Polish 
Socialist Party, Liberation Party, Peasant Party, and even the Polish Communist Party, Pilsudski 
overthrew the government of President Stanisław Wojciechowski and Prime Minister Wincenty 
Witos with only minor violence.25  On 31 May, the Sejm offered Pilsudski the office of the 
Presidency, but once again he turned it down due to the inherent weakness of the possession. 
Instead, one of his colleagues, Ignacy Mościcki, was elected with Pilsudski assuming the office 
of PM from 1926 to 1928 and again in 1930.26
                                                 
21
 Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état, 10. 
   
22
 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 111. 
23
  Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état, 20-21. 
24
 Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, 55. 
25
 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 171. 
26
 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 179. 
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Pilsudski did not pursue major reforms and distanced himself from the more 
revolutionary left that had been his allies in the coup.27 He did not abolish the Constitution of 
1921, only altering it from a parliamentary system into a presidential system with a strong central 
government.28 After the coup of 1926, a movement called Sanacja, or sanitation, governed 
Poland with Pilsudski as its guiding hand. Sanacja was a political ideology developed by 
Pilsudski and comprised of his allies, who were disgusted at the corruption in Poland’s 
government and the weakness of its economy.29
 Effectively, Pilsudski ruled as a strongman or quasi-dictator seemingly working within 
the confines of the constitution, but in effect, ruling by decree with the Sanacja controlled Sejm 
rubber stamping his orders.
 It was formed of a coalition of the right, left, and 
center that eschewed political parties as only self-serving entities. Sanacja served as the major 
force in the Sejm until the initiation of the Second World War. 
30 Additionally, governmental positions were filled with “Pilsudski’s 
colonels”, the block of military officers that had formed under the Marshal during World War 
One. These colonels saw Pilsudski not as a political leader but as their old commander to whom 
absolute obedience was owed. This, coupled with Pilsudski’s general contempt for politicians, 
meant that the true governing force in Poland was a small cohesive group of men.31
Though Pilsudski’s leadership was somewhat authoritarian, it was accepted by many of 
the Polish people. The stability it brought allowed the economy to begin its recovery, the rights 
of minorities in Poland were protected, and the nation began a process of industrialization.
  
32
                                                 
27
Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état, 157-158. 
 
28
 Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, 57. 
29
 Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état, 362. 
30
 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 511. 
31
 Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état, 338. 
32
 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 512. 
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Furthermore, fear of the rebuilding Germany and USSR was justification for many that 
authoritarianism was the only method to protect the nation’s very existence.33 Problems did arise 
in that Pilsudski did not understand that the Sejm would resent illegalities even if they brought 
success. Likewise the quasi-dictatorship of Pilsudski brought disapproval by the Western 
democracies on the idea of a Polish nation, at a time when Germany was beginning to demand 
changes to the post-war order of Europe.34
Though he did not play much of a role in politics during the last years of his life, 
Pilsudski’s presence was crucial to the existence and legitimacy of the Polish government.
  
35 With 
his death in 1935, the entire Sanacja movement lost much of its impetus. Pilsudski’s 
authoritarian method of governance left him isolated and without peers, meaning, when the time 
came to find a replacement, no challenger could come close to matching the force the Marshal 
had been in Polish politics.36 The Sanacja movement which had relied completely on Pilsudski 
for its ideological content and cohesiveness began to splinter in his absence. Three groups 
emerged each claiming to be the successor of Pilsudski’s vision: the left under Pilsudski’s aid 
Walery Sławek, the center under President Ignacy Mościcki, and the right under Pilsudski’s 
military successor Edward Rydz-Śmigły.37 Rydz-Śmigły emerged as the next head of the Polish 
state due to an alliance with Mościcki, and his years in power were marked by clashes with the 
Sejm that made the Sanacja movement evolve into far more right-wing authoritarianism than it 
had ever been under Pilsudski.38
                                                 
33
 Edward J. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), 9. 
 At the same time Pilsudski’s protection of ethnic minorities was 
34
 Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy, 9. 
35
 Rothschild, Pilsudski’s Coup D’état, 367. 
36
 Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, 69. 
37
 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland,406-412. 
38
 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland,512. 
20 
 
 
overturned, and a program of “Polonization” was implemented in regards to Poland’s 
minorities.39
Since the Coup of 1926 there had been opposition to the Sanacja movement, united 
primarily by the desire for a return to parliamentary democracy.
 With Pilsudski gone, the popular support for the Sanacja government began to 
evaporate. Pilsudski’s cult of personality was often evoked by Rydz-Śmigły, but he proved to be 
a poor successor to the Marshal.  
40 Pilsudski’s death and the move 
to open authoritarianism by his successor reinvigorated the opposition to challenge the 
legitimacy of the Polish government. The group that would come to have the most influence 
among the opposition was the Morges Front, founded in February 1936 by General Władysław 
Sikorski and the former Polish Prime Minister Ignacy Paderewski in the Swiss town of Morges.41 
The Morges Front was backed by the French government who, though they had, in theory, a 
binding military alliance with Poland during the 1920s and 1930s, at the same time had been 
supporting the opposition to Sanacja.42 Sikorski, a former general in the Polish Army, living in 
self-imposed exile in France, had effectively become a French agent, spending his time 
attempting to rally support away from the pre-war ruling party.43 By joining with the deposed 
Prime Minister Ignacy Paderewski, Sikorski and the Morges Front had a compelling claim to be 
the legitimate government of the Polish state. Many Polish politicians fled the Sanacja 
movement in the late 1930s to join with the Morges Front, creating a pool of pro-parliamentary 
Poles outside of Poland.44
                                                 
39
 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 460-463. 
 French support of the Front factored into how many in the West 
40
 Davies, God's Playground, 313-314. 
41
 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 418. 
42
 Halik Kochanski,The Eagle Unbowed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 26. 
43
 Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, 418. 
44
 Jerzy Jan Lerski, Historical dictionary of Poland, 1966-1945 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996), 151. 
21 
 
 
viewed Rydz-Śmigły government, raising questions about the acceptability of not only the Polish 
government but the Polish state.  
 Poland’s internal struggles were compounded by their international position. The Polish 
state lived under the constant threat of a German-Russian alliance, the same alliance that had 
been responsible for the partitions at the end of the 18th century.45 Yet the Poles found 
themselves isolated in Eastern Europe between the successor states of the former partitioning 
powers. The foundational conflicts with Germany and the USSR further soured the already poor 
relations between Poland her two neighbors. This, coupled with the historical animosity felt by 
the three nations, all but precluded any form of alliance between Poland and the two great states. 
Both Germany and Russia claimed much, if not all, of the territory which comprised the new 
Polish state, despite the fact that all of the territory, and more, had belonged to Poland before the 
partitions at the end of the 18th century. To compound the point, the Germans made their feelings 
on the issue official government policy in 1925 at the Treaty of Locarno. There the German 
government formally recognized its post-Versailles boundaries in the West, but not the East, an 
event that led to a damaging trade war between Poland and Germany.46 Poland’s eastern border, 
seemingly settled by the Treaty of Riga was less of a flash point than the West, yet the 
persecution of the Poles, marooned inside the USSR, by Joseph Stalin’s government showed the 
animosity was still alive and well.47
                                                 
45
 Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers.1.  
 If the Polish nation was to secure its position through 
alliances with either Germany or the USSR, there is little doubt that the allying power would 
demand territorial concessions, concessions which would set a dangerous precedent and 
46
 Gordon Martel, editor, The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered A.J.P. Taylor And The Historians 
(London: Routledge,1999), 38-49. 
47
 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2012) 89. 
22 
 
 
represent a betrayal of the Polish people. Allying with either of their historical foes would be 
tantamount to giving up their newly-won independence, relegating them to little more than a 
puppet state as they had been in the Polish Congress Kingdom, the regime set up in the aftermath 
of the Napoleonic wars comprising of the Polish territory controlled by the Russian Empire.48
Just as important, any alliance with Germany or Russia would be a betrayal of the Poles’ 
own worldview. Since the foundation of a true Polish state, identified as the adoption of 
Christianity by Mieszko I in 966, the Poles had seen themselves as members of the Western 
European community.
  
49  With their adoption of Catholicism in 966, the links it provided to the 
West meant law, art, and philosophy flooded into Poland transforming its feudal organization 
into what the Poles came to see as an enlightened Republic.50 Since that time, the Poles have 
linked themselves to the West through alliances, royal marriages, and political ideology. In this 
light, the Poles’ only option for strengthening their national security was through alliances with 
the West. Their preferred choice was their traditional ally, France, and its new ally, England. 
France and Poland had been allies as far back as the 16th century, with the marriage of French 
princesses to Polish Kings, and grew stronger in the 18th century with the marriage of Maria 
Leszczyńska to Louis XV of France.
51 After the partitions of Poland in the 1780s and 1790s, 
Napoleon’s France established a Polish satellite state, The Duchy of Warsaw, in 1807 out of the 
Prussian areas of the partitions. He later expanded the Duchy to include Austrian portions; the 
Duchy lasting until his fall in 1815.52
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large Polish émigré community and welcomed many refugees from failed uprisings of 1832 and 
1863.53
During the Poles’ struggle for independence in 1918-1920, the French sent arms, support, 
and a military mission, including a young Charles DeGaule, to advise the Polish Army.
  
54 France, 
after the First World War, was open to the idea of a Franco-Polish alliance as well as a strong 
Polish state. With the loss of their Entente ally Russia to communist revolution, France desired a 
strong Eastern European power to aid in her defense against any future resurgent Germany.55 
Poland, with its large size and links to France, offered the best option for their policy of 
containment. Furthermore France sought to use the Eastern European states, Poland in particular, 
as a Cordon Sanitaire to seal off the West from the Bolshevik threat of the USSR.56  With this in 
mind, France and Poland signed the Franco-Polish Military Agreement on 19 February, 1921.57
The United Kingdom, however, was a different situation altogether. Due to the threat of 
Germany and the USSR, the Poles, in the opening days of their independence, saw expansion to 
their geographical limit as the only way to safeguard their national sovereignty. The United 
Kingdom, a country with little knowledge of Polish culture, history, or political ideology, saw 
the expansion, hypocritically, as rank imperialism which would upset the already fragile balance 
of power in Europe. This attempt to maintain the European balance of power, in line with 
Britain’s traditional on the continent, was designed to keep Britain’s markets, the basis of her 
 
The agreement was aimed at threats from Germany and the USSR and assured military action by 
both nations if one of the signatories suffered an "unprovoked" attack. 
                                                 
53
 Davies, God's Playground, 209. 
54
 Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, 94-95. 
55
 Cienciala and Komarnicki, From Versailles to Locarno, 5. 
56
 Cienciala and Komarnicki, From Versailles to Locarno, 13. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy, 10. 
57
 Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed, 35. 
24 
 
 
prosperity, open. A balance of power for the British, therefore, meant a strong Germany. Polish 
expansion, even to the borders established at Versailles was a detriment to the rebuilding of the 
German economy.58 As the 1920s progressed, the British became increasingly sympathetic to the 
Germans plight. They felt guilt for the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles, and believed that the 
German-Polish border was unjust.59 Poland’s western border, the British agreed, could not last. 
They also felt that Poland and the Eastern European states were bound to fall under German 
control eventually as the east was Germany’s natural sphere of influence, just as the United 
Kingdom’s was in Western Europe and the Mediterranean.60 With the signing of the Franco-
Polish Military Agreement, the Polish nation was further harmed in the eyes of Great Britain as 
they viewed the treaty as turning Poland into a French satellite, just as they had viewed the 
Duchy of Warsaw in 1808, thus rousing long dormant fears of French hegemonic ambition in 
Europe. This led to diplomatic back-pedaling on the part of the French, who were desperate to 
keep the British on the best of terms to form a united front against a weakened, but not 
destroyed, Germany. The British, it was decided, were a far better ally to have than the Poles.61
Starting with the Locarno treaties in 1925, the French began a gradual retreat from their 
grand post-war design of containment. Without another great power, i.e. Britain, the French did 
not feel strong enough to pursue a policy with Poland and the other Eastern European nations. 
Britain’s insistence at Locarno that France abandon their eastern allies in order to normalize 
relations with Germany convinced many in Poland, most importantly Pilsudski, that the West 
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could not be relied on to insure the survival of the Polish state.62 The Anglo-French entente and 
France’s eastern alliances effectively canceled each other out, weakening both in the process. 
France subordination of its foreign policy to that of the United Kingdom hampered their original 
policy of containment and forced them to retreat from their post-war Eastern European sphere of 
influence, leaving Poland adrift searching for a lifeline.63
The failure of their western diplomatic gambit all but forced the Poles to reevaluate their 
position in Europe. Pilsudski and the Polish Foreign Minister Colonel Jozef Beck’s response was 
a policy of equilibrium and an individual action Eastern Europe.
  
64  This equilibrium was 
designed to counterbalance their French allies’ concentration on Western security by means of 
Polish actions in the east, thus raising the value of Poland as a French ally and allowing them 
more say in the allied decision making process.65
The foundation of this equilibrium was the attempt to achieve normal and more 
importantly neutral relations with both Germany and the Soviet Union. Polish foreign policy 
 Beck and Pilsudski’s plans also centered on the 
idea of self-reliance. As they considered Poland a reincarnated great power, they were 
determined to act as a great power, attempting to use their supposed strength as leverage in 
dealing with the nations of Eastern Europe. Their successful defense of Warsaw in 1920 and 
subsequent counterattack, which despite French supplies was primarily a Polish undertaking, 
helped to convince many in the Polish government that their policy of self-reliance was the right 
one. In reality there attempts to act as a great power were often interpreted poorly by the West 
and led them to overplay their hand, based on the illusion of their own importance. 
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throughout the next decade consisted of attempts to solidify its national security through a series 
of non-aggression pacts. The first major pillar in the Pole’s policy was the signing of the Soviet–
Polish Non-Aggression Pact with the USSR on 25 July 1932. The Pact was to last three years but 
was later changed to remain in place until 1945.66 In the agreement, both sides vowed to 
renounce violence in their mutual relations, to resolve problems through negotiations, and to 
forgo any armed conflict or alliances aimed at the other side. The Soviets desired an arrangement 
with the Poles due to the Japanese attack on Manchuria in 1931. Fearing a war with Japan in the 
east the USSR was eager to sign a non-aggression pact with Poland to ensure the security of its 
western border.67 The success of the agreement for the Poles was two-fold: first it shored-up its 
eastern frontier at a time when France, at the behest of Britain, was distancing itself from its 
agreements with Poland. Though the Poles saw the Soviet-Polish Pact as in keeping with the 
Franco-Polish alliance, as France had also signed such a treaty with the Soviets in 1931.68
Indeed, the Poles’ attitude toward their western neighbor was becoming more 
complicated as the 1930s progressed. With the rise of the Nazi Party and Adolf Hitler to power 
in 1933, the German repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles, their program of rearmament, and 
increasing nationalism were watched carefully by the Poles. Pilsudski, now in his later years, 
saw the revanchist Nazi party as a future threat to Polish security. His reaction was to propose a 
preventive war to France and the United Kingdom, to remove the Nazis from power before Hitler 
had further time to rearm. The West’s reaction was one of shock and horror, and they quickly 
 
Secondly, the pact with the Soviets strengthened Poland’s position, weakened due to the trade 
war, in negotiations with a rapidly rearming Germany. 
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refused the proposition. This unwillingness to act against the Germans seriously weakened 
Pilsudski’s faith in French aid to Poland and led to a cooling in Franco-Polish relations. 
Pilsudski’s fears were compounded by the construction of the Maginot Line, which he foresaw, 
correctly as it turned out, as a French signal that in the event of war with Germany, France was 
to conduct primarily defensive operations.69
 With France seemingly taking itself out of the picture, Pilsudski saw his only recourse as 
a non-aggression agreement with Germany to solidify Poland’s western border. Three factors 
made such an agreement possible. First, Germany leaving the League of Nations and the 
Disarmament Conference enabled Pilsudski to use the international isolation of Hitler’s new 
regime to approach the Germans from a position of strength.
 This went against the joint planning that had been in 
place since 1921, which consisted of coordinated attacks from France, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia into Germany. 
70 Second was that before Hitler’s 
regime, the precondition for the normalization of relations between Poland and Germany had 
always been the revision of Poland’s western border. Though Pilsudski was unable to get a 
German guarantee on the border’s integrity, Hitler’s isolation and need for time to rebuild 
Germany in his image caused him to drop the precondition.71  Third, was a French proposition to 
the Germans claiming that if they concluded a non-aggression pact with the Poles, in return 
France would support limited German rearmament and consider German claims to portions of 
Poland’s western border.72
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Additionally, Pilsudski considered Hitler’s government to be less dangerous to the Polish 
state than the USSR. Pilsudski assumed that because Hitler was an Austrian and not Prussian, his 
claim to Polish territory was more political theater than an actual policy goal.73 The terms of the 
German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact, signed 26 January 1934, were heavily in Poland’s favor. 
Both nations swore to resolve all problems through bilateral negotiations and forgo armed 
conflict for a decade. A subsequent trade agreement ended the harmful trade war which had 
existed for the past ten years.74 To reassure France, the Poles explicitly stated in the treaty that 
the pact did not compromise any of their prior international agreements, primarily the Franco-
Polish Military Agreement.  The treaty was still received poorly in France, with the Poles blamed 
for weakening their two-front solution vise-a-vi Germany. Some also charged the Poles with 
weakening the Wests policy of collective security by pledging peace with Germany. The truth, 
however, was that the West was already sabotaging the idea of collective security by their retreat 
from their Eastern European alliances, and their willingness to give in to Hitler’s demands for the 
sake of maintaining the peace.75
With Pilsudski’s death in 1935, the Poles lost not only the glue that held their government 
together, but also their guiding hand on the international stage. German rearmament, meanwhile, 
continued with the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 and turned into geographic 
expansion with the Anschluss with Austria in 1938. In both cases, Poland’s Western Allies, for 
economic and political reasons, neglected to stop the blatant German violations of the Versailles 
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Treaty. As the Nazi Reich attempted to gather all Germans within its borders, Poland, with its 
sizable German minority, around 100,000 in 1939,76
The West’s policy of appeasement, of giving into Hitler’s demands for the sake of 
preventing war, seriously alarmed the various Eastern European nations dependent on the West 
for their survival. As the West appeased, Beck, now Pilsudski’s foreign policy successor, began 
to rely more heavily on making unilateral decisions in Eastern Europe.
 looked on with growing concern.  
77 This attempt to survive 
autonomously had dire repercussions for the Polish state. Becks policy of rapprochement with 
the Germans had the effect of making the Poles seem almost an ally of Germany.78 With French 
inaction during the German remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, the basis of its alliance 
with Eastern Europe, its willingness to fight, was almost completely undermined. Knowing that 
the French would not act, Beck nevertheless informed them that Poland was ready to aid them 
militarily in actions against the Germans. At the same time Beck informed the Germans that the 
Poles did not object to their actions. Beck’s message to the Germans was soon discovered by the 
French, heightening suspicion already present due to the Poles’ quasi-fascist government.79 In 
1938, Beck accepted the German Anschluss with Austria, unwilling to speak out due to French 
and Italian inaction. By chance, an incident on the Polish-Lithuanian border occurred in the same 
week, and Beck used the fear of a Polish-Lithuanian Anschluss to force the Baltic nation to 
reinitiate long broken diplomatic relations. Disastrously, this action gave the West the image of 
Polish collusion with the Germans.80
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The situation further deteriorated with the signing of the Munich Agreement at the 
Munich Conference on 30 September 1938 by Germany and the Western powers. The agreement 
granted Germany the Sudetenland on the western border of Czechoslovakia, home to a large 
German population, in exchange for a guarantee from Hitler that this would be his last territorial 
demand.81 The Sudetenland also served as the strategic key to Czechoslovakia’s defense due to 
the presence of the Czech border forts and much of their armaments industry.82
Poland’s reaction to the Munich Conference was mixed. In the lead up to the conference, 
as Hitler was agitating for the cession of the Sudetenland, Beck attempted to pursue a policy of 
options. He made demands on the Germans in regards to the Polish minority in Slovakia, in case 
the West abandoned the Czechs, while simultaneously restating their agreements with France, on 
the slim chance that the West would stand against Hitler.
 Its absorption by 
Germany left the Czech state defenseless. Throughout the negotiations, Czechoslovakia, in what 
would become precedent for many future negations on Poland, was not consulted.  
83 With the conclusion of the Munich 
conference, on 30 September 1938, Beck issued an ultimatum to the Czechs demanding they 
cede the territory of Tesche, home to large numbers of Poles.84 The next day the Czechs 
acquiesced and Polish troops entered the territory. Beck’s rationale for the action was twofold. 
First, it was primarily meant as a protest against the major powers for being left out of the 
conference that decided Czechoslovakia’s fate. Beck’s vision of Poland as the great Eastern 
power demanded that they be included in such important decisions.85
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ethnic Poles. Aside from nationalism, Beck felt that if the Germans possessed such an area they 
could offer to exchange it for the Polish Corridor, the strip of land that connected Poland to the 
Baltic, and other territory won by the Poles in the Greater Poland Uprising of 1918. Beck may 
have feared that the West would unilaterally agree to such a trade without consulting the Poles 
just as they had at the Munich Conference.86 Whatever the reason, the Poles’ seizure of Tesche 
stigmatized them in the eyes of the West. To France and the United Kingdom, this was further 
evidence of collusion between Poland and Germany.87
The charge leveled at Beck, of turning Poland into a German accomplice, does not hold 
up to scrutiny. Through he used the Germans’ actions to his advantage, Beck showed no 
willingness to form an alliance with Hitler’s government. From 1935 onwards, Hitler had floated 
the idea of Poland joining the Anti-Comintern Pact, a proposition repeatedly turned down by 
Beck.
 Combined with the Poles authoritarian 
government; this put the Poles, in the eyes of many, within the fascist camp of Europe.  
88 Hitler also sought Polish aid in an attack on the USSR, claiming that the Poles would 
gain vast lands in the east, especially Ukraine, in return for giving up their claims to the Polish 
Corridor.89
With Central Europe firmly under its control, Germany began demanding the return of 
the Polish Corridor. To push the issue, on 28 April 1939, Hitler withdrew from the German–
 Again Beck declined. Though the West saw Beck as becoming too close to Germany, 
in truth, France’s policy of appeasement sabotaged its alliance with Poland. The only option left 
to Beck was his rapprochement with Hitler. Due to the German claims on Polish territory, they 
could not afford to anger Hitler and were therefore forced into their own version of appeasement.  
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Polish Non-Aggression Pact five years prematurely and began to threaten the Poles with war if 
they did not acquiesce to Germany’s demands.90 Beck’s reaction was based on his view of 
Poland as a great power. In the face of the growing German threat, he proposed a Third Europe 
policy, a continuation of Pilsudski’s Intermarium idea. Believing that Czechoslovakia would 
disintegrate after the loss of the Sudetenland, he planned to construct a bloc of Eastern European 
states based on an alliance between Poland and Hungary, who would gain a common frontier at 
the expense of Slovakia.91 This idea fostered on the illusion of Poland as a great power, was 
supposed to create a third bloc in Europe, with the support of the West, to counteract the 
German-Italian alliance. This would allow the nations of the east to have more say in the 
containment of Germany and ensure there were no further territorial concessions given to Hitler. 
The project failed due to disinterest on the part of both the West and the various Eastern 
nations.92
In the summer of 1939 the Poles were left with little option but to reestablish and 
reinforce their alliances with the Western powers, the same powers that had made clear their 
unwillingness to fight. The Poles saw an alliance with the appeasing nations of France and Great 
Britain as the only choice available aside from capitulation to one of their neighbors. On 31 
March, Poland received guaranties from France and the United Kingdom that Poland’s territorial 
 More importantly on 15 March 1939, Hitler violated the Munich Agreement and 
annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia. With the entire country under German control, this ended 
the possibility of a common border between Poland and Hungary, the backbone of Beck’s policy. 
The actual result was that Poland now found itself surrounded by Germany on three sides. 
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integrity would be defended by the two powers.93 These efforts were sabotaged on 23 August 
1939, when the unthinkable happened. In Moscow the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed 
between Germany and the USSR. The agreement vowed non-aggression between the two powers 
and pledged the USSR’s noninvolvement in a European war. There were numerous reasons for 
the Soviets to sign such a pact.  First, the signing meant they might safely deal with the Japanese 
in the east without the fear of a German-Japanese alliance.94 Second, was the threat of German 
expansion, through war or territorial concessions, to the Soviet border, leaving the USSR’s 
heartland without a buffer zone.  Third, Stalin new that an invasion of Poland would put 
Germany at war with the West, buying time for him to strengthen the USSR, thus the pact was in 
the best interest of Soviet security.95 For Hitler, the pact secured his eastern border so that he 
could face the Western powers if they decided to stand with Poland, without the threat of falling 
into a two front war.96
Much has been said about the USSR’s overtures for collective security against the 
Germans, and the Western powers attempts to gain such an alliance. In truth, the only Soviet 
offer for a defensive pact with the Poles came in 1933, though the offer was only an attempt to 
sabotage the current Polish-German rapprochement.
 Yet, it was the pact’s secret protocol that would eventually lead to the 
Second Republic’s downfall.  
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West and the USSR. British Prime Minister Chamberlin, the architect of Munich, desired a 
general defensive pact with the Soviets. Their asking price was a free hand in the Baltic States, 
through which they feared a German attack might come. Chamberlin was unwilling to grant such 
demands, not trusting the Soviets to stop their expansion in the Baltic, and fearing that such 
expansion could be the cause of the war he was currently attempting to prevent. Mainly, his 
unwillingness to conclude a defensive pact with the Soviets was because he still believed that he 
could reach some kind of agreement with Hitler.98
The Poles, for their part, were unwilling to join in any alliance with the USSR that would 
allow Red Army troops on Polish soil. Despite French insistences that they accede to Soviet 
demands the Poles refused stating that allowing the Soviets to garrison Polish territory would be 
the same as letting the Germans garrison Alsace and Lorraine.
  
99 Though Polish hesitation was a 
minor part of the breakdown in negotiations, it was a convenient scapegoat for the West’s 
withdrawal.100 While the Soviets seemingly sought collective action with the West, 
simultaneously they were conducting negotiations with the Germans.101
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declarations of firm action from the West.102 The Soviets’ goal was always to buy time to 
strengthen the USSR for the eventual conflict with Germany. An alliance with Poland might 
have precipitated a war with the Germans without the aid of the West. By allying with Hitler, the 
Germans would turn their vision West where, in Soviet terms, the capitalist nations could 
exhaust themselves leaving the USSR in a position of strength.103 If Hitler proved a danger to the 
Soviet Union, Stalin understood that the Western Allies would always welcome him into their 
fold, he could join them any time he wished.104
Even with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, on 23 August, the Poles and the 
British signed the Polish-British Common Defense Pact which, with the almost two decade old 
Franco-Polish Military Alliance, formalized the military alliances implicit in the Allies 31 March 
guaranties.
  
105  Despite the alliance, in France there was a split in the cabinet over what the French 
reaction to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact should be. Some advocated the immediate mobilization 
of the French Army to show solidarity with the Poles. Others wanted to renege on their 
guarantees to Poland due to the absence of the USSR from the equation.106
The British alliance with Poland was not a friendly one but one born of necessity. With 
the failure of appeasement, it was realized that a conflict that would revise the European balance 
of power was inevitable. The British were adamant that the battle must be fought outside of the 
United Kingdom; the treaty with Poland would ensure that.
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the West. Yet even at this late hour the Western Allies were still willing to give in to German 
demands. Though the Polish-British Pact had already been signed, members of the British 
cabinet suggested such plans as an Anglo-German declaration eschewing aggression as a means 
to policy or offering the Germans territory in Africa in exchange for dropping its claims in 
Eastern Europe.108 These pleas only convinced Hitler that the United Kingdom was not serious in 
its guaranties and would not stand against him if he moved on Poland. Even as late as September 
2, a day after the conflict had begun, the United Kingdom still hoped for an armistice and a 
Munich style conference to grant Hitler’s demands.109
The Second Polish Republic was born into a fatal position. The glory days of the 
Commonwealth were far behind them, destroyed by over a century of foreign rule. Poland’s 
mission in the inter-war years can, therefore, be described as an attempt to establish its legitimate 
place on the European stage both in its internal politics and its foreign policy. The Poles 
experiment-with-democracy failed due to the position they found themselves in. Formed from 
the remnants of three great autocratic states, they had insufficient time to foster a healthy 
democracy. With corruption, economic woes, and mass disillusionment with a parliamentary 
government, the Poles turned to authoritarianism to provide stability both at home and abroad. In 
doing so, they weakened their claims to legitimacy in the eyes of the Western powers in a Europe 
that was quickly splitting into fascist and anti-fascist camps. Their attempts to act as a great 
power in the east only weakened their already tenuous position in Europe, their victories against 
the Germans and the Soviets after the First World War drawing them into the illusion of strength. 
 Yet by this time it was too late, German 
troops were already engaging the Poles inside the Polish borders. 
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Yet a Poland stuck between a resurgent Hitler and Stalin had little hope of survival. Furthermore, 
they relied on the West to aid them in their continuing existence, unaware of how hollow the 
seemingly mighty nations of France and Great Brittan truly were. The First World War impacted 
the Western Powers in a way that the Poles did not understand. Whereas Poland won its 
independence as a result of the conflict, the only result seen by the West was the loss of an entire 
generation of its youth. Such nations were not willing to risk another war for an Eastern 
European “backwater.” In this way, the Polish nation was doomed from the start. It is said that 
successful diplomacy relies on their being choices, yet, in many ways the Poles had none.110 
Their only options were an alliance with one of the former partitioning powers, which meant 
their continued existence as a vassal state, or an uncertain alliance with the West. Beck’s attempt 
to limitedly pursue both only resulted in Poland becoming the last of Germany’s victims while 
simultaneously causing the Western powers to see the Poles as turning into an ally of Germany. 
While it is true that a policy of attempting to maintain the status quo may have been more 
successful than trying to independently assert Poland’s great power status, it too was doomed to 
failure so long as the great Western powers refused to back up their words with force.111
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CHAPTER II 
The Fourth Partition  
The German-Soviet Invasion of Poland: 1939-1941 
 
Polish defense plans against a German invasion originated in the early 1930s with the rise 
of the Nazis.1 Pilsudski’s rapprochement with the Germans was designed, at least in part, to give 
the Poles time to better prepare themselves for an eventual war with Germany.2 Poland’s military 
at the beginning of the decade was among the most modern and effective armies in Eastern 
Europe. It had an army of well over half a million men with modern small arms produced in 
Poland.3 From their French allies they inherited a formidable artillery force and doctrine and 
possessed modern anti-tank guns and rifles.4 In terms of armor, the Polish military had, 
unfortunately, fallen prey to the Tankette (small two-man tanks) fever that was sweeping much 
of Europe. They had up-to-date Tankettes, but they would come to learn, just as the British and 
Italians would, the weakness inherent in the design, most importantly their poor speed and 
maneuverability, and lack of anti-armor capability.5 The Poles also retained a large number of 
cavalry divisions, mostly mounted infantry, amounting to around 10% of their army. These 
horse-mounted troops had proven invaluable during the Polish-Soviet War for their ability to 
move swiftly through terrain that was impassable to motorized weapons.6
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an air force composed of modern aircraft and well trained pilots.7 Such was the strength and 
confidence of the Polish military that twice in the early 1930s, the Poles had proposed to the 
French plans for a joint preemptive invasion of Germany, first by Pilsudski in 1933 in reaction to 
German rearmament8 and again by Foreign Minister Beck in 1936 in reaction to the 
remilitarization of the Rhineland.9 Both times the horrified French refused to mobilize. By 1937-
38, however, the Polish military had begun to lag behind. The weakness of their economy 
precluded them from keeping up with most of the technological advancements of the other great 
powers.10 In contrast with the Germans, who completely rebuilt their military into a modern 
fighting force, the Poles were forced to pick and choose what they would invest in. Nevertheless 
in late 1938 and 1939 Poland began to upgrade its military to more modern equipment, starting 
with their 7TP Tank, a design superior to most German tanks at the time.11
Despite these deficiencies, the Polish plan for resisting a German invasion was an 
ambitious one. As most of Poland’s wealth and industry was located in the westernmost area of 
the country, this was the area that must be defended. The problem was that from the border with 
Germany to the Vistula River, in the middle of the country, the terrain was almost completely 
open fields with no geographic features that aided in the defense of Poland. With this in mind, 
many, including foreign advisors, pushed the Poles to abandon the western portions of their 
 Unfortunately, by the 
beginning of hostilities, the Poles had managed to build only 140 of 7TPs, leaving it vastly 
outnumbered by the German armored forces.  
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nation and deploy defensively behind their rivers.12 The Polish high command was vehemently 
opposed to such a strategy because of the importance of the western territories to the Polish war 
effort. Moreover, a retreat from the areas claimed by Germany might give the Western Allies the 
opportunity to make a separate peace with Hitler just as they had in the Munich agreement.13 The 
Polish General Staff’s solution to this problem was dubbed Plan Zachód, Plan West. Predicting a 
German assault towards Warsaw or Gdansk, the Poles planned to defend their western borders 
from the outset and conduct a slow, steady fighting retreat to their eastern defenses while the 
reserves of the Polish Army mobilized for a counterattack against the advancing Germans.14 
Crucial to Plan West was the Poles’ alliances with France and the United Kingdom. The plan 
called for the Poles to hold the Germans in place while the French and British, honoring their 
promises to the Poles, would launch offensives into western Germany, forcing the Wehrmacht to 
redeploy many of its troops to the West. This would allow a Polish counterattack to push the 
Germans back.15
Plan West had taken a serious hit, however, in March, 1939, when the Germans annexed 
the remainder of Czechoslovakia. The Germans now outflanked Poland. With German armies 
able to strike from the East Prussia in the north, Germany proper in the west, and Slovakia in the 
south, Poland’s Plan West was untenable. While Polish strategists still expected the main 
German thrust to come from Pomerania, with any attack coming from the north or south being a 
minor diversionary action,
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guns, 2500 tanks, and 2315 aircraft - a total of one and a half million men against Poland. This 
compared to Poland’s 39 Infantry Divisions (of which many never completed mobilization), 
2065 guns, 615 tanks, and 400 aircraft - a total of 950,000 men.17 Furthermore, the German 
Armed Forces were well trained and ready for a modern type of warfare relying on piercing 
armor attacks and coordinated air power as the primary instruments of battle, as opposed to the 
Poles who, like the rest of the world, saw these as support for infantry formations.18
 Polish problems were compounded by their reliance on the West for action. For the 
French the Poles were all that was left of France’s collective security dream of the early 1920s.
 The sheer 
size of the Wehrmacht also allowed them, in contrast to Polish thinking, to attack with three 
strong armies from the north, west, and south.  
19 
Their attempts to placate their British allies by distancing themselves from such a policy looked 
to have backfired. Effectively the French decided to back Poland because they had no other 
option. In May of 1939 at the Franco-Polish staff talks, the French promised that, in the event, of 
war their army would begin a limited offensive against Germany within three days of 
mobilization, with the goal of relieving pressure on the Poles. Once mobilization was complete, 
about 16 days after it began, the French would begin major offensive operations.20 Yet, as 
Pilsudski feared, the French saw the coming war as a repeat of the last - a war of attrition that 
would evolve into trench fighting. Therefore, their planning was almost entirely defensive-
minded when it came to operational strategy.21
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subject to German aggression. Instead the British planned to bomb Germany in retaliation for 
bombing Poland.22 Their promises of offensives to the Poles had been little more than lies. 
Neither the French nor the British had any plans for large scale actions against the Germans. 
Indeed, there is evidence that the West never had any intention of saving Poland in 1939. Poland 
role in the Allied grand strategy, unbeknownst to the Poles themselves, was to provide breathing 
space for the West.23 The French and British expected the Poles to last three to four months, in 
which time the Anglo-French allies could marshal there forces and confront the German war 
machine at a later date.24 The Poles were not informed of these developments and went ahead 
with Plan West in the understanding that the Western Allies would honor their promises to begin 
offensive operations against Germany’s western frontier. As the Chief of the British Imperial 
General Staff Edmund Ironside stated, “The French have lied to the Poles in saying they are 
going to attack. There is no idea of it.”25
The West hindered the Poles’ war-planning in another way as well. Throughout the late 
summer and early fall of 1939, the West pressured the Polish government to stall the 
mobilization of its army in an effort to avoid the appearance of provoking the Germans.
 
26
                                                 
22
 Zaloga, Poland 1939, 65. 
 Yet, at 
the same time that France and the United Kingdom were issuing these pleas, the Wehrmacht was 
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Map 2. “Map of German and Soviet Invasions of Poland: September 1939” 
Probert, Matt and Leela. 1993 - 2013 The New Society for the Diffusion of Knowledge Southampton, United 
Kingdom - http://www.probertencyclopaedia.com/photolib/ 
maps/Map%20of%20Polish%20Campaign%201939%201966.jpg (accessed April 23, 2013). 
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The hammer did fall on the night of 31 August 1939, when members of the German SS 
dressed as Polish troops seized the Gleiwitz radio station on the Polish border and began 
transmitting anti-German propaganda in Polish.27 The Gleiwitz operation was one of a number of 
artificial casus belli created by the Germans as an excuse for their invasion. The first overt act of 
war occurred at 4:40 AM on 1 September 1939, when the German Luftwaffe attacked and 
destroyed 75% of the Polish village of Wieluń, a target with almost no military value, killing 
1,200 civilians,28 an ominous portent of German conduct in the coming war. Five minutes later 
the German battleship Schleswig-Holstein, anchored in the harbor under the pretext of a courtesy 
visit, opened fire on the Polish transit depot at Westerplatte in Danzig. 29 As 1 September 
unfolded, German armies struck into Poland from the north, west, and south, without a formal 
declaration of war. Polish forces resisted fiercely for the first few days in what is known as the 
Battle of the Borders, fighting night and day without rest to hold back the Germans.30
On 3 September, France and the United Kingdom declared war on Germany but offered 
little more than words to support the Polish forces in the field.
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time. By 7 September, German forces were in the outskirts of the Polish capital of Warsaw.32 At 
this time, the Polish Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, abandoned the failed 
Plan West and ordered a general retreat to the south and east, at the same time moving the Polish 
government to more defensive terrain around the Romanian border, the so called Romanian 
Bridgehead.33 His new plan was to use the area’s mountainous terrain and rivers to nullify the 
advantage of the German armored divisions and hold out until winter and beyond awaiting the 
promised Western offensive to begin. The Poles treaties with Romania would allow them to 
receive supplies from their allies through ports on the Black Sea.34
This plan, however, became obsolete on 17 September 1939, seventeen days after the 
German invasion, when the USSR, as agreed upon in the secret protocols of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact, commenced a westward invasion of the Polish Republic. Since the initiation of 
hostilities, the Germans had repeatedly requested the Red Army begin operations into Poland.
  
35 
The Red Army was already positioned along the Polish border waiting for the command to go. 
Yet the Soviet government was adamant in resolving its five month undeclared war with Japan in 
the Far East before beginning operations into Poland. This resolution came on 15 September, 
when Ambassadors Molotov and Shigenori Tōgō signed an agreement, the Nomonhan Cease-
fire, ending the hostilities on 16 September 1939.36
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in Moscow stated that with the imminent defeat of the Polish Army, the Soviets feared that a 
political vacuum would emerge in the eastern portions of Poland. With this political cover the 
Soviet Union invaded Poland claiming that they were doing so to end the intolerable political 
and economic conditions under which the national minorities in the borderlands were forced to 
live.37
Yet the official reason for the Soviet invasion, delivered to the Polish embassy in 
Moscow on 17 September, stated that Warsaw was surrounded and ready to capitulate to the 
Germans; therefore, it was no longer the capital of Poland. In addition, the whereabouts of the 
Polish government were unknown and their armies were in flight. As such, the Soviets declared 
that the Polish government had abandoned its people, meaning that the Polish state had ceased to 
exist, and any treaties, such as the Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, signed between the 
former Polish state and the USSR were void. The Soviet Union therefore laid claim to the eastern 
border lands in order to prevent any contingency that might transform them into a threat to the 
USSR.
 The pretext for the Soviet’s aggression, protecting the Ukrainians and Belarusians living in 
Poland, mirrored many of the German’s claims to Polish territory.  
38
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small battles, to which the Soviets responded with massacres and atrocities, especially targeting 
Polish commissioned and non-commissioned officers.39
 Sandwiched in between the advancing German and Soviet Armies, the Polish forces in 
the field began to disintegrate. By 29 September, Poland’s fate was sealed; the remnants of the 
Polish Army in the field were retreating south, following the Polish government into Romania, 
and from there making their way west to France to reform and continue the fight.
  
40 In the entire 
campaign, which lasted slightly over a month, the Poles lost almost one million soldiers killed, 
wounded, and captured. More disturbing was the almost 200,000 civilian dead left in the wake of 
the German attack.41 In the first instance of Hitler’s ruthless racial war for lebensraum, living 
space, against the people of Eastern Europe Germans treated Polish citizens that fell into their 
path as sub-human, using atrocities to forestall civilian resistance and attacking fleeing refuges 
with their air force.42 Even more frightening was the implementation of Operation Tannenberg, 
the systematic extermination of over 20,000 Polish intellectuals, clergy, activists, and politicians 
in the wake of the advancing Wehrmacht. The SS units responsible for the massacres, the 
forerunners of the Einsatzgruppen, used their experience in Poland to perfect the methods they 
would later use in the extermination of Jews during Operation Barbarossa.43
 The speed at which the Germans pushed the Polish Army back, and indeed the rapidity of 
the invasion itself has led to a number of myths about the entire September Campaign. The most 
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famous and longest lasting is the myth of Polish cavalry charging German tanks with nothing but 
sabers and lances. This myth was derived from a successful Polish cavalry attack on German 
infantry at the Battle of Krojanty , who were then counter-attacked by German armored cars. The 
rumor that the Poles had attacked the armor was begun by the Germans, with the help of an 
Italian war correspondent, as a propaganda attack on the Polish military.44 In reality the Polish 
cavalry, the elite of the Polish Army, was trained to use their horses for maneuver then dismount 
and fight on foot. Only against targets of opportunity were they trained to attack while mounted, 
which they did on many occasions in September 1939.45 In addition, the Polish cavalry had 
towed anti-tank weapons and carried the most effective anti-tank rifle in the world at that time. 
The Polish cavalry formations served effectively as mobile reserves and excelled in covering the 
Polish Army’s retreats. They proved to be among the ablest of formations the Poles possessed in 
the September campaign.46
Another myth that still is published in military literature, such as John Keegan’s, The 
Second World War
 
47 is that the Polish Air Force was destroyed by the Luftwaffe while still on the 
ground in the wars opening hours. In reality, the Polish Air Force had been, in the weeks before 
1 September, removed from its military bases to camouflaged airfields in the Polish countryside 
in order to prevent their destruction before they could be employed.48
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among the best trained in the world, managed to shoot down or damage beyond repair some 560 
German planes, 25% of the Luftwaffe’s air power at the loss of 330 aircraft.49
A third myth is that the Polish military was broken quickly and offered little resistance to 
the German Armed Forces. Being the first campaign of the Second World War and one that was 
isolated from the West, the course of the fighting is not well known, and the speed at which the 
Poles were defeated in the field seemed astonishing. This, however, does not hold up to scrutiny. 
The Poles won many battles against both the Germans and the Soviets, but, without any support 
or coherent overall strategy, they were unable to exploit any of their victories.
 The Polish pilots 
that escaped to France would fight there in June of 1940, and later, flying alongside British, 
French, Norwegian, Czech, Slovak, Dutch, Belgian, American, and Commonwealth pilots, 
would be instrumental in the Allied victory in the Battle of Britain.  
50 Over 16,000 
Germans were killed in the fighting, while the Poles suffered the loss of some 66,000 men 
defending their homeland.51 The outnumbered Polish defenders held out for over a month against 
the German onslaught and the Soviet invasion. France and the United Kingdom only held the 
Germans alone for a little over a week longer even though they possessed superior numbers of 
men and equipment.52
The question then becomes; why was the September campaign so great a defeat for 
Poland? Poland’s own military deficiencies must take much of the blame. Their flawed and 
outdated overall strategy, Plan West, weakened the limited strength of their military by 
attempting to defend the entirety of their western border. Compounding this was their failure to 
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realize the scope of the German attack and the size of the forces that Germany would employ. 
Most importantly, the Poles were expecting to fight a different type of war. France and the 
United Kingdom were expecting a replay of the trenches of World War One, and Poland was 
expecting a war similar to their conflict with the USSR in 1920. In reality, they became the first 
victim of a new type of war, which would come to be labeled blitzkrieg.53
Poland’s’ inter-war economy was able to build a first class army in the late 1920s, but 
was unable to modernize and support a military machine able to stand up to a rearmed Germany, 
let alone the USSR as well. Had they better employed their forces, perhaps they may have been 
able to meet the advancing Germans on more favorable terms. Yet this strategy would have 
necessitated the abandonment of the western portion of their nation, a massive political and 
economic sacrifice. The pre-war emphasis of the Polish command on tactical and strategic 
improvisation at the expense of trained doctrine also hindered Polish efforts to resist their foes.
 Against the German’s 
fast moving combined arms armored and air attacks, the Poles found their tactical and strategic 
weapons to be obsolete, just as the West would discover for themselves in June 1940.  
54
Just as responsible for the campaign’s failure was the inactivity of the Western powers. 
Though the majority of Germany’s military strength was engaged in Poland and despite the 
military agreements between the Poles and the West, the only major operation by the Allies was 
the French Saar offensive, from 7 to 16 September, in which 40 French divisions, along a 16 
 
The breakdown in command structure and communication caused by the piercing German 
armored thrusts rendered the Polish command incapable of organizing any joint operations on-
the-fly as they had trained to do during the past decade.  
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mile front, drove 5 miles into Germany before withdrawing.55 Though Some French did urge an 
all-out offensive against the Germans, these voices were in the minority.56 The United Kingdom 
resigned itself to flying bomber missions over German cities, with the aircraft dropping leaflets 
rather than bombs.57
The West’s lack of action seemingly proved Hitler’s statement that France and the United 
Kingdom would not truly fight for Poland correct. The German military was free to focus all of 
its attention on Poland without having to worry about its western border. As Walther von 
Brauchitsch, commander of the German Military, had sated in the first week of September, 
“every day of calm in the West is for me a gift from god.”
  
58 Without an Allied offensive into 
Germany, the pre-war Polish plan and indeed the retreat to the Romanian bridgehead were 
doomed to failure. Despite the promises, guaranties, and assurances that France and the United 
Kingdom had given the Poles all throughout the summer of 1939, when the conflict actually 
began the West failed to honor their word, deciding to use Poland’s resistance to buy time. For 
the Poles, their reliance on the West proved a major weakness from which there was no obvious 
solution. This Western inactivity even after the fall of Poland led into what is called the Phony 
War from September 1939 to May 1940, where despite numerical and technical superiority, the 
Allies refused to launch a major offensive against Germany.59
 Perhaps the greatest single reason for the speed with which Poland was defeated was the 
intervention of the USSR. With two of the most powerful nations in the world conspiring to 
subdue them, the Polish military could not successfully resist. Without a Soviet invasion, it is not 
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impossible to believe that the Poles might have held the Romanian bridgehead, with its defensive 
terrain, hidden supply caches, and access to the reserves forming in eastern Poland until winter.60 
Yet the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact represented a diplomatic coup, and in hindsight, a death knell 
for the Polish Second Republic. Becks policy of equilibrium had proved a failure, the isolation it 
had engendered keeping Poland from finding its legitimate place in Europe. Just as in the past, 
the German and Russian states had put aside their numerous issues to focus on the one thing they 
both agreed upon - the destruction of an independent Polish state. After securing their armistice 
with the Japanese, the Soviet invasion of Poland proved the fatal stroke to the Poles military 
resistance. The Soviets effectively used Poland just as the Western Allies had, a way to buy time 
and space. Stalin knew that he would most likely have to fight Hitler at some point. By allying 
with the Germans over the corpse of Poland he ensured that Hitler would turn to the West rather 
than continue on against the USSR.61
With the campaign lost, the Polish government crossed into Romania. They did so with 
the repeated verbal guaranties of the Romanian government that they would be given aid and 
access to the Black Sea from which they could make their way to the West.
 Stalin’s deal bought the USSR two years to prepare for 
conflict against the Germans, and ensured that the opening battles of the war would be fought in 
Eastern Europe not in the heart of European Russia. Poland, however, was to pay the price for 
both the West and the USSR’s breathing space.  
62
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 This was in keeping 
with the numerous treaties and agreements signed between the two nations in the inter-war years, 
most notably the Treaty on Mutual Assistance Against Aggression and on Military Aid, signed 9 
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February 1927.63 As they headed south, the Poles received word from their allies that they were 
welcome to come and reform their government in France. Yet, due to pressure exerted by Hitler, 
the Romanians reneged on their verbal and written agreements. They detained and separated the 
members of the Polish government as well as disarming and interning the Polish military that 
had escaped into the country.64
The Western governments made little effort to persuade the Romanians to release the 
internees, and it is unlikely that the Romanians would have complied due to the Germans 
threatening military action against them. Due to this the, pre-war president, Ignacy Mościcki saw 
no choice but to resign the office in order for an exile government to form in France to take over 
the responsibilities of governance. What allowed this to occur was the fact that the Polish 
constitution was very flexible. It foresaw the possible need of a government-in-exile and 
contained nothing that would prevent the existence and function of a state authority outside of 
the nation’s borders.
 
65
Mościcki’s first choice to replace him as president was the Polish Ambassador to Italy, 
General Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski. Shockingly, after being nominated on 25 
September, the next day the French government and the Polish politicians already present in 
France, led by General Władysław Sikorski and members of the Morges Front, refused to 
 Having been conquered and partitioned many times before in their history, 
it is no wonder that the Poles would have rules in place to keep the state operating if it were to 
happen again.  
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recognize him as president.66
Due to the Franco-Polish front against the Sanacja government, it became readily 
apparent, as the government-in-exile began to form, that it was to be made up primarily of the 
pre-war opposition, the French backed Morges Front in particular, rather than members of the 
Sanacja. 
 Wieniawa-Długoszowski’s had been one of Pilsudski’s colonels, 
Pilsudski’s personal aide-de-camp, and had assisted the Marshal in the organization and planning 
of the 1926 coup. This put him firmly in the tradition of the pre-war Sanacja government - the 
same government Sikorski and other Polish politicians in France had opposed.  
67 There are two reasons for this development. First, France and the United Kingdom 
were home to large numbers of Poles that had fled or been deported from Pilsudski’s Sanacja 
Poland. Consequently, the Poles living in the West, as well as the Western governments 
themselves wanted the new Polish Government-in-Exile to represent a more democratic 
government than that possessed by pre-war Poland.68 Indeed the French decision to exclude 
Sanacja members from the forming Polish Government-in-Exile was in keeping with their inter-
war policy towards Pilsudski’s government. Though France had, in theory, a binding military 
alliance with Poland during the 1920s and 1930s, they had at the same time been supporting the 
opposition to the Sanacja.69
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 The fall of Poland offered both France and the pre-war opposition 
the perfect chance to end Sanacja rule. Second, the pre-war government, with its primarily 
Sanacja membership, was interned in Romania unable to play a further role in Polish politics. 
Other politicians, due to their perceived lack of importance, were able to escape and make their 
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way to France.70 France, in many ways, was attempting to mold the shape of the Poles post-war, 
perhaps in order to ensure a Poland that was more subservient to French interests and less 
independently minded. Indeed there is some evidence that the French government, in order to 
further their goal of changing the Polish government, even exerted pressure on the Romanians to 
keep the pre-war government incarcerated and therefore off the political stage. Additionally, by 
warning their preferred Polish leaders of the so called “Romanian Trap” the French made sure 
that the Polish politicians they desired made it to the West.71
In this climate, after deliberation in Paris, former President of the Polish Senate 
Władysław Raczkiewicz was put forward as the preferred candidate.
  
72
The appointment of the moderate Raczkiewicz as president and of Sikorski, an old 
opponent of Pilsudski’s government, as Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish 
Armed Forces, represented a complete break from pre-war Poland. Many members of the 
military, especially its officer corps, were angered at the change in leadership. The new 
government, however, claimed that the change was not an alteration but a restoration. The 
government-in-exile being made up primarily of the pre-war opposition to Sanjacia, could claim 
that they represented the legitimate Polish government that had been overthrown in Pilsudski’s 
coup.  By claiming these democratic roots, they could also claim the support of the Polish people 
 Raczkiewicz was chosen 
due to his moderate stance and in order to bridge the gap between the pre-war divide. The 
Western Allies also accepted his nomination and on 30 September 1939, President Mościcki 
resigned his position; Raczkiewicz, already in Paris, was sworn in as the first President of the 
Polish Government-in-Exile. Among his first orders was to appoint Sikorski as Prime Minister.  
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for their governance.  Yet from the start, Sikorski compounded the internal problems of the 
government-in-exile. When appointing his cabinet, he deliberately made it larger than necessary 
in an attempt to include members of every major pre-war party, thus representing every shape of 
political opinion. In all, the government had 22 representatives on its national council primarily 
of opposition members but also including those remaining Sanacja members who had managed 
to escape from Romania.73
 Internal problems aside, the position that Raczkiewicz and Sikorski found themselves in 
was not enviable; they represented a government without a country and were at war 
simultaneously with two of the most powerful nations in the world. They did possess a small 
navy, air force, and army which were quickly being reorganized for the defense of France and 
operations in Norway. Though small, this force represented the third largest Allied contingent 
behind the militaries of France and the United Kingdom. Additionally, the government-in-exile 
was recognized by these nations as well as the United States as the legitimate government of 
Poland.
 This resulted in a disjointed government whose lack of unity would 
cause many instances where no course of action could be decided. The government-in-exile, 
effectively, had created for itself the same problem that the Sejm had possessed in the early 
1920s. The very gridlock and partisanship that had precipitated the May Coup had been 
reestablished by Sikorski leading to the same lack of action on important issues.  
74
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 Aside from directing their troops to aid in the Allied cause, a failing proposition which 
forced the government-in-exile to relocate from Paris to London, the Poles spent much of their 
time in discussions with the Allies regarding the reestablishment of Poland at the end of the war 
and denouncing Soviet actions in their occupied country.  
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The destruction of the Polish nation in September 1939 was the first decisive step in the 
fall of Second Republic. With the loss of their territory, and therefore the source of their power, 
the new Polish Government-in-Exile was almost solely reliant on the support of their Western 
Allies. In reality, all of the Allies’ promises and words could do nothing to aid them. The speed 
at which Poland fell and the reshaping of its government by outside forces also damaged the 
reputation of the Polish government, painting them as a collection of inept puppets. The Poles 
reliance on the West to safeguard their independence, coupled with their own overblown image 
of their own power mean that when Hitler decided he would have his war, Poland stood little if 
no chance. The intervention of the Soviets into Eastern Poland was the final blow, setting the 
stage for the eventual death of the Polish Second Republic 
58 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
“Our” Soviet “Allies” 
The Polish-Soviet Alliance: 1941-1943 
 
On 14 November 1939, General Sikorski and British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax met 
to discuss Soviet policy in Poland. In this meeting they deliberated over what they thought were 
the Soviets’ long term aims: Sikorski submitted that it was the Stalinization of Europe, or at least 
its eastern portions. What was unknown was how the Germans would fit into the equation. 
Would they be partners or opponents to the Soviet scheme? Lord Halifax thought the latter was 
more likely.1 On 19 June 1940, with the expulsion of the British Expeditionary Force from the 
continent and fall of France to the Wehrmacht imminent, Sikorski met with the British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill to discuss Soviet aims in light of the German victory in the West. 
Sikorski told Churchill that while not advocating for the Allies to provoke the USSR, he warned 
against holding any illusions in regards to Stalin’s policy towards the West. Churchill, expressed 
interest in friendly relations toward the Soviets stating, prophetically, that after the United 
Kingdom defended herself successfully, Hitler might be tempted to strike Russia in the next 
spring, thus bringing into the Allied fold a powerful ally against the Germans.2
Churchill’s assumption came to pass on 22 June 1941. With the German invasion of the 
USSR, the Western Allies, now consisting of the United Kingdom, its empire, and the various 
governments-in-exile, saw a prospective new ally to aid them in their struggle against their 
common enemy. To the British Hitler’s invasion of the USSR was a godsend. Having borne the 
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brunt of the war since the capitulation of France in June 1940 they were eager to integrate the 
Soviet Union into the Allied war effort. Even before the initiation of Operation Barbarossa, the 
German invasion of the USSR, the British foreign office had begun to reestablish its links to the 
Soviets, severed after their invasion of Poland, based on Churchill’s belief that a German attack 
on the USSR was inevitable.3
The London Poles were also willing to reestablish diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union despite the role the Soviets had played in the destruction of their country. On 23 June 
1941, Sikorski addressed the Polish nation on the German-Soviet War. He spoke of the great risk 
that the German nation was taking by invading the USSR; not only did the Germans lose a 
powerful ally and access to unlimited resources, but by invading they also betrayed their fear of 
the strength of the Soviet Union and its ability to influence events in Europe. More importantly 
for Poland, the German invasion represented the end of years of collaboration between the two 
nations over Poland’s future. Since the first partition of Poland in 1772, Germany and Russia had 
always seen eye to eye on one issue: the elimination of Poland. With this new conflict, Sikorski 
claimed that this old partnership had ended once and for all. In addition, the German betrayal 
meant that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939 had been rendered void, meaning, he hoped, a 
return to the pre-war borders of the Treaty of Riga, promised numerous times by the British 
government, after the Allies secured victory. In this spirit, Sikorski called for the Soviets to 
release the Polish prisoners that they had taken in 1939, so they could aid in the common 
 As German troops massed on the Soviet border, Churchill insisted 
that when the hammer fell Britain be ready to aid the Soviets in any way possible. When the 
invasion began, the British pounced. 
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struggle against the Germans.4 Stalin, for his part, desperately sought troops to confront the 
German onslaught. With whole Soviet armies being swallowed up in vast German encirclement 
operations, the Soviets began looking for alternate sources of man power. Stalin was so desperate 
for men he confided to the American President, Franklin Roosevelt’s, diplomatic advisor Harry 
Hopkins, that when the United States entered the war, which he thought would be soon, he 
would welcome the deployment of independent American forces on the Eastern Front.5
With both the Soviets and the Western Allies desperate for each other’s aid, an agreement 
between Stalin and the Polish Government-in-Exile was seen as vital. Sikorski and the London 
Poles realized this, and the weakness of their position in regards to the Soviets. Throughout the 
preliminary talks for the Polish-Soviet alliance, the issues that would arise from the conflicting 
interests of the two parties were skimmed over or postponed to a later date. The Poles understood 
their lack of power in the negotiations and guessed, correctly as it turned out, that the future of 
the Polish sate would depend on their allies’ good will. Understanding the Western Allies were 
not willing to antagonize their newfound ally by opposing Stalin’s expansionist ideas, Sikorski 
sought to bypass any issues that might appear to the United Kingdom as obstructing the course of 
negotiations.
 
6
Despite their desire for goodwill, the London Poles had certain conditions for military 
collaboration with the Soviet Union; foremost was the recognition by the Soviets of the Treaty of 
Riga and the repudiation of the 23 August 1939, Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Next, they argued 
for the release of all Polish citizens being held in bondage by Soviet authorities. Any formation 
 The Poles were willing to make a deal with Stalin to show their goodwill to the 
Allied cause to the United Kingdom.    
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of Polish fighting units in the USSR would be dependent on the sovereignty of any such units, 
and their employment in battle would be solely up to discretion of the London Poles. 
Furthermore, any military force formed would be under the care and protection of the Soviets 
and would be supplied and equipped by them as well.7
 In these discussions, the fractured nature of the government-in-exile reared its ugly head. 
Members of the rightist parties, fiercely anti-communist, threatened to resign if the government’s 
leftist members made deals with the Soviets without territorial guaranties from Stalin. As the 
terms of the treaty between the Poles and the USSR were being negotiated, three ministers of the 
cabinet resigned when Sikorski signaled his intent to enter into an alliance with Stalin without 
such guaranties or the release of all Poles interned in the USSR.
  
8
Nevertheless the negotiations resulted in the signing of the Sikorski-Mayski Agreement 
on 30 July 1941, a Polish-Soviet treaty which annulled the 1939 Soviet-German treaties 
regarding Poland.  This agreement restored diplomatic relations between the two nations, called 
for joint military operations against the Axis powers, and gave amnesty to Polish prisoners being 
 Due to a diplomatic 
breakthrough, Sikorski was able ensure the release of the Polish prisoners, but without Stalin’s 
agreement on Poland’s post-war borders, the damage had already been done; the three resigned 
members left the government. This discord would arise throughout the war, leading to a 
government that the Allies viewed as obstinate and to be avoided even as Sikorski sought to find 
intermediate ground. The inflexibility of the London Poles was part of the reason that the Allies 
were content to decide the post-war fate of Poland without the involvement of the government-
in-exile, just as Pilsudski had done with the squabbling Sejm.   
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held by the USSR. An additional treaty, the Polish-Soviet Military Agreement was signed 14 
August 1941. This facilitated the formation of Polish Army in the USSR. The Poles conditions 
were primarily met with the signing of this document. The new Polish Army would serve the 
London Poles, and its soldiers would take an oath of loyalty to said government. While the force 
would exist under Soviet operational command, it would not be employed without Polish 
agreement and would be staffed by Polish officers. Additionally, the USSR would outfit the 
troops to be reimbursed by the Polish government once the war had been won.9  The army 
created by this agreement, it was thought, would be used to help stem the tide of the German 
invasion and help, even if only slightly, to lessen the operational burden of the Red Army. Yet 
while Stalin would welcome the aid of Western troops in his time of need, his view on the Poles 
was more considered. Even at this early date, as the Germans were advancing deep into the 
Soviet Union, Stalin was intent on keeping the territory he had gained in the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact.10 An independent Polish force fighting its way into Poland alongside the Red Army would 
have complicated his vision of post-war Europe. As the Poles would discover in the coming 
years, Stalin would never give arms to those not directly under his control to him. In regards to 
the shape of post-war Poland, a secret protocol was also included in both documents, stating that 
any territorial claims or other issues were to be dealt with at a later time.11 Sikorski’s attempts to 
garner goodwill while dealing with the Soviets were, effectively, forced on him by the British.12
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The reason for the Poles’ acceptance of this rather vague secret protocol were the repeated 
guaranties made by the Western Allies, Britain in particular, that Poland’s prewar borders would 
be recognized upon the cessation of hostilities. On 30 July 1941 British Foreign Secretary Eden, 
issued a note stating the United Kingdom would recognize no territorial changes that had 
affected the Polish state since August of 1939. Furthermore, Eden assured Sikorski that Great 
Britain had made no agreements with the USSR which would affect the relationship between the 
United Kingdom and Poland.13
In hindsight Sikorski and the London Poles may have missed their best chance for a 
favorable post-war outcome in these original negotiations with Stalin.
  
14 The suffering and strain 
that the Germans were visiting upon the USSR was enormous, Stalin’s power was at its weakest, 
and his need for aid at its height. Had the Poles forced the issue of territorial integrity, against the 
wishes of the United Kingdom and the USSR, and been willing to compromise they may have 
been able to secure some measure of survival for the Second Republic in the post-war world. 
Stalin may have seen the Poles support in his dark hour as more important that something in the 
unforeseen future. At the same time, the Soviets were aware of the British pressure on the Poles 
to comply with Soviet demands.15
In regards to the war, Sikorski, Churchill, and Stalin agreed that the new Polish Army 
would be used to help shore up Soviet defenses against the Germans, and therefore should be 
 They could and did bet on Britain’s understanding that Anglo-
Soviet cooperation was more important than the problem of Polish borders. So long as the British 
were pushing the Poles to accept Stalin’s terms, he had no need to compromise with the London 
Poles, knowing that the British would ensure that he would get his way.  
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made operational as quickly as possible. Sikorski and Churchill also agreed that the Polish force 
should be assembled and deployed as closely to British supply and military bases as was 
possible, showing accurate foresight of problems that would arise between the Soviets and the 
Poles over the creation and use of the Polish forces.16
The entrance of the USSR into the Allied war effort in June 1941 was just as harmful to 
Poland’s cause as the Nazi-Soviet invasion. Poland’s sway as the third largest Ally power 
resisting the Germans was greatly diminished by the entry of the Red Army. It became obvious 
to the Western Allies, and the Poles alike, that the Soviets were far more important to the 
struggle for victory that some half a million Polish troops or the national integrity of Poland’s 
post-war borders. The hesitance on the part of the Poles and British to press Stalin on the issue of 
Polish territory while he was at his weakest proved a dire mistake for future negations. The 
London Poles still possessed a measure of strength and had the recognition and the British 
promises to back them up, yet, from this point on, there importance would rapidly begin to 
dissipate. 
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CHAPTER IV  
“Za naszą i waszą wolność”1
The Polish Army-in-Exile: 1940-1945 
  
 
Perhaps the Polish Government-in-Exile’s greatest strength was the military forces that it 
could, and did, contribute to the Allied cause. Despite the loss of their nation, Poland was 
determined to fight for its freedom rather than wait for the Allies to give it to them. With this 
resolve, the newly formed Polish government went about recreating a Polish Army of as large a 
size possible. The creation of this army-in-exile served two of the Polish goals. First, it showed 
that even though Poland had been conquered as a result of the German and Soviet occupation, its 
government, recognized by the Allies, still represented the Polish people and possessed an armed 
force that would actively be resisting the occupying powers. Secondly, the presence of a large 
Polish military force, it was hoped, would allow the government-in-exile to gain a place on the 
Allied War Council. This would give the Poles an important position within the Allied camp and 
a voice in Allied decision-making and war-planning, vital for the Poles to retake their homeland.2
The origins of what would come to be known as the Polish I Corps go back to the 
September campaign of 1939. After the Soviet invasion of 17 September, the Polish Army still in 
 
As the war went on, the Polish Armed Forces became even more important to the government-
in-exile as it represented one of their major continuing contributions to the Allied war effort. 
Operational Polish soldiers, sailors, and airmen, it was thought, ensured that Poland would be 
fully reborn after the conflict. Though they would begin their time in exile with a large amount 
of men at their disposal, for most of the war, Poland would be represented on the ground by only 
two formations, the Polish I and II Corps. 
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the field followed their final orders and retreated south into Romania and Hungary, with the 
intention of escaping Eastern Europe and reforming in France alongside the Polish government 
in order to continue to offer resistance to the invaders of their country. This plan was interrupted 
due to German threats to Romania and Hungary, resulting in the retreating Polish troops being 
disarmed and interned just as their government had been.  The cost of keeping so many Polish 
prisoners was prohibitively expensive, and the pre-war friendships that existed between the three 
nations, meant that many Polish servicemen escaped with the aid of the Romanians and 
Hungarians who usually looked other way.3
Upon joining the government-in-exile’s forces, they formed a large sovereign Polish 
Army. Yet, for many reasons, including the fact that many of the French Poles worked in areas 
the French saw as crucial to the war effort, only a portion of the forces desired by the Poles were 
able to be raised. In all, some 43,000 Poles were formed into four infantry divisions and an 
armored brigade in France.
  
4 What resulted was a peculiar army, mixed in its composition in 
every way imaginable, just as the Polish Army had been at the founding of the Second Republic. 
There were pre-war Polish soldiers to be sure, but mixed in among them were, artists, writers, 
priests, university professors, former French Foreign Legionnaires, Polish settlers from Peru, 
Polish miners from France, and even the former Polish ambassador to Berlin. The politics of the 
army also varied from the right wing Poles that had managed to escape Poland, and left wing 
Poles who had been living in France, some to escape Pilsudski’s Sanajca.5
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Further complicating the problems of forming a competent new army was that many in 
the French political and military command blamed the Poles for provoking the Germans and 
starting the war.6 Others did not wish to allocate military resources to the Poles due to their swift 
defeat at the hands of the Germans.7 Due to the feeling that the Poles were not willing, or simply 
unable to fight, they were put at the “bottom of the rung” for supplies, billeting, and training.8 As 
well, the French for the most part, ignored Polish intelligence about new German technology and 
tactics. Yet the French did take time to study the short Polish War and from it tried to derive the 
German’s strategy. The problem was that each person who looked at the September campaign 
took a different lesson from it, usually proving arguments they had long made, such as 
DeGaulle’s emphases on offensive armor operations, General Georges stressing the use of air 
power coordinated with ground forces, or even Chamberlin who saw the fighting in Poland as 
proof that the bomber was the key to victory. The common conscious in the French command 
was that the Germans actions in Poland were based on the specific strategic situation and 
therefore, their action in the West, while maintaining some similarities, would be different. They 
were determined to not make the same mistakes as Poland such as defending their entire border 
or marching out to meet the blitzkrieg.9
Despite these problems, the Poles had one unit that was combat-ready by the time Allied 
operations in Norway began on 14 April 1940. The Polish Podole Brigade was sent to Narvik to 
aid in its recapture from the Germans. While there, it performed admirably, but the entire Allied 
 As some French officers snidely put it France was not 
Poland. In reality, the French would make their own mistakes.  
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mission proved a failure, and the expeditionary force was pulled out on 8 June, with the Polish 
brigade forming the rearguard, to aid in the defense of France.10
Having played no part in the fighting in the low countries in May 1940, when the German 
invasion of France proper began on 5 June 1940, the negative opinion of the Polish Armed 
Forces was quickly forgotten and the hastily thrown together Polish divisions were put into the 
line of battle at Petén’s personnel request. Despite not having been adequately trained, supplied, 
or armed, the rough Polish divisions, having previous experience fighting the Germans, were 
determined to prove their worth. On 26 May, the Polish 1st division held Metz against four 
German divisions, leading Petain to despair that “If there had only been ten Polish divisions, 
victory would have been assured.”
 
11 Throughout the fighting, the experienced and motivated 
Poles were often used to cover the retreating French Army, holding bridge heads and even 
launching counter offensives to take pressure off of French units. The 10th Armored Cavalry 
Brigade, the name given to the reformed “Black Brigade”, the only mechanized and undefeated 
Polish unit in September campaign, had been given little training in their time in France and 
were issued old French tanks only shortly before they were ordered into battle. Despite this, they 
rode out to the front, holding off a German attack on 13 June and providing a rearguard for 
retreating French units for five days until, due lack of fuel and ammunition, they were forced to 
abandon their tanks.12 With the French armistice, Sikorski ordered the Polish forces to make their 
way to the sea and then to the United Kingdom.13
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forced to surrender to the Germans while others decided to retreat into Switzerland where they 
were interned for the remainder of the war.14
The Polish force that had escaped to the United Kingdom was vastly smaller than the four 
divisions they had possessed in France. When reformed in Brittan, there proved only enough 
manpower to outfit two units. The decision was made that the war effort could be best served by 
the formation of an armored division and parachute brigade. 
 This tremendous loss of men and the chaos of the 
French campaign convinced the Poles that, from then on, Polish units would only fight in 
cohesive formations and not be scattered piecemeal across a whole battle front.  
The armored division, labeled the 1st Polish Armored Division was formed primarily 
from the survivors of the Polish “Black Brigade” and subsequent 10th Armored Cavalry Brigade, 
reinforced by Polish volunteers. The British, having seen the success of Polish units fighting in 
France, and needing all the manpower they could muster, were much more free-handed than the 
French in their supplying of the division, issuing the Poles modern tanks for the first time and 
giving them the task of defending a section of the Scottish coast against the feared German 
invasion.15 It was later assigned to be used in the invasion of the continent. Fearful of the heavy 
casualties that the first wave would encounter and due to the fact that the division comprised a 
large portion of Polish servicemen engaged in the war effort, it was agreed by the Allies that the 
division would be employed in the second phase of the invasion, the Normandy breakout. On 1 
August 1944, the same day as the uprising in Warsaw began, the Polish division was brought 
ashore at Normandy.16
                                                 
14
 Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed, 217. 
 The regiment quickly gained a reputation for aggressiveness, desiring to 
kill Germans above all else. Its moment of triumph came on 19-21 August when the division 
15
 Koskodan, No Greater Ally, 136. 
16
 Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed, 481. 
70 
 
 
held Mount Ormal through three days of continuous fighting in the key battle to close the Falaise 
pocket, and destroy the encircled Wehrmacht in Normandy.17 For the rest of the war, the division 
faced continued actions against the Germans, helping to push them back through Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and into Germany proper. In their push into Germany, they liberated the towns of 
Saint-Omer, Ypres, Ghent, and Passchendaele ending the war and capturing and occupying the 
Kriegsmarine naval base in Wilhelmshaven.18
The Polish airborne unit, dubbed the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade, was 
created with the intent of dropping an experienced, trained, and well-supplied force into Warsaw 
after the initiation of an uprising.
 
19 From the very beginning, however, the shortage of transport 
aircraft and the vast distances involved proved a hindrance to such a plan. With the initiation of 
the Warsaw uprising on 1 August 1944, the brigade encountered further problems due to the fact 
that Stalin would not allow Allied planes supporting the uprising to land at Soviet airports, an 
absolute necessity for any airborne jump into Warsaw.20 With the reason for their original 
creation denied, political pressure was put on the London Poles to release the brigade into Allied 
command, to be used in the upcoming operation Market Garden. Due to the Soviet intervention, 
the lack of available aircraft, and in order to prove the Poles commitment to the Allied cause, the 
brigade was released to British service.21
In Operation Market Garden, the Polish brigade was put into battle far too late after it 
was clear to the Allied command that the operation had failed. In what serves as a microcosm for 
Poland’s struggle during the Second World War, the use of the Polish Parachute Brigade in 
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Market Garden did nothing but squander a large number of trained Polish fighting men at the 
expense of the resistance in Poland itself. Despite the hopelessness of their cause and the Allies 
having dropped the brigade onto enemy-occupied landing zones, resulting in extreme casualties, 
the brigade fought valiantly, making a river crossing under enemy fire and providing cover to 
allow the British airborne to escape the German encirclement.22 To add further insult, for many 
years the Poles were blamed for the debacle by one of the operations planners, Fredric 
Browning, despite the fact that it was poor planning in the first place that led to the useless 
slaughter. It was not until many years later when personnel accounts of the battle and a 
comprehensive history by Cornelius Ryan were published that the Poles were absolved of the 
false accusations.23
The beginnings of what would come to be the Polish II Corps also lay in the September 
Campaign, but rather than being comprised primarily of those soldiers that had escaped 
southwards, it would be composed of Polish POWs taken by the USSR in their westward 
invasion of Poland. After the Soviet invasion on 17 September 1939 more than 1.5 million Polish 
citizens, including over 240,000 Polish POWs, had been deported from Soviet-occupied Poland 
by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, the NKVD, to the Gulags of the eastern 
USSR.
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Soviets gave numbers and statistics which claimed that most of the Poles had been released. The 
Polish ambassadors pointed out that the numbers were wildly inaccurate based on other 
documents given to the government-in-exile by the Soviets themselves. The Soviets promised to 
look in to the matter, yet the point would come up again and again throughout the formation of 
the army.25
Granted amnesty by Stalin, the POWs and volunteers from the civilian prisoners who had 
been released would be trained, equipped, and supplied by the USSR. As stated in the military 
treaty, the army would be subordinated to the command and authority of the Polish Government-
in-Exile.
  
26 This was an early and rare recognition by Stalin as to the legitimacy of the London 
Poles, most likely due to the Soviets need for all the assistance they could get. Operation 
Barbarossa was still advancing deep into the USSR causing millions of casualties, capturing even 
greater numbers of POWs, and showed no signs of stopping. Even with the size of the Red 
Army, and the harsh penalties imposed by Stalin on those who retreated in the face of the 
Wehrmacht Stalin realized that it would still take a massive effort to drive the Germans back, if 
the Poles could aid in the endeavor then he was willing to use them, at first. The London Poles 
under Sikorski appointed General Władysław Anders, just released from the NKVD’s Lubyanka 
prison in Moscow, as the commander of the new Polish II Corps that would eventually come to 
be called Anders Army. As Anders made his way south, on 17 August General Michał 
Tokarzewski began forming the Polish Army-in-Exile in Totskoye, near the Kazakhstan border, 
in the remains of a camp where the Soviets had kept Polish prisoners of war.27
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followed, Polish prisoners, freed by Stalin’s amnesty, began to coalesce in the area from the 
eastern USSR.  
By the spring of 1942, over 75,000 soldiers had been recruited into the Polish II Corps 
and been formed into four infantry divisions. General Anders was given specific guidance by 
Sikorski on how these troops should be employed. Most importantly, the Polish troops must not 
be used as Soviet cannon fodder. They should not be split up and spread out over the front, as 
they had been in the Battle of France, but rather fight as a cohesive Polish Army. The troops, 
Sikorski stated, were far too important to the future of Poland to be wasted; they would be 
needed after the war to assure that communism was not transplanted by the Soviets onto Polish 
soil. Additionally, Anders was to make sure that the army would not be used in battle until they 
were combat ready. Sikorski also suggested that the Poles be used in the Caucuses, as this was 
fast becoming a decisive front and was also near British lines of supply, which would aid in their 
success.28
During the formation of the II Corps, questions began to arise that would have disastrous 
consequences in the coming year. While the II Corps had a great deal of manpower, there was a 
distinct lack of officers. A significant number of Polish officers listed by the Soviets as POWs 
were missing from the II Corps rolls; they had never arrived at the marshaling areas. When the 
London Poles received this vexing news, they petitioned the Soviet government seeking 
information about the missing officers while citing their importance to the Poles’ and Soviets’ 
joint war effort.  The problem was first brought up on 7 October 1941, when the Polish 
ambassador inquired as to the location of some 7,500 Polish officers. The ambassador pointed 
out that the officers had failed to be located despite strenuous efforts by the Polish government. 
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Soviet authorities responded that the London Poles had misplaced the officers.29 The requests for 
information about the missing officers continued throughout 1941 and into 1942.30  The Polish 
government became more concerned as time went by because, all together, these missing officers 
made up almost half of the pre-war Polish Armies’ officer corps, and they were direly needed by 
the new Polish Army forming both in the USSR and in the United Kingdom. The government-in-
exile’s questions concerning the officers’ locations were overlooked, ignored, or written-off by 
Soviet authorities. Stronger and continued inquiries by the London Poles into the location of the 
missing men were eventually answered personally by Stalin. In their meeting, Stalin assured 
Sikorski that all the Polish prisoners, including the missing officers, had been freed, but they 
could not all be accounted for due to having lost track of them in Manchuria after the German 
invasion.31
At the same time the Soviet authorities were making it increasingly difficult for the 
Polish forces to reach combat readiness. First, there was an ongoing dispute with the Soviets 
over whether non-ethnic Poles, Jews, Belarusians, and Ukrainian who were citizens of the 
Second Polish Republic were eligible for recruitment into the II corps. As the Second Republic 
was a multi-ethnic nation, the government-in-exile assumed that all citizens would be allowed to 
be recruited into the army. As this was the agreed-upon policy in the 30 July 1941 Sikorski-
Mayski Agreement, the Polish embassy in Moscow delivered a note to the Soviets on 10 
November 1941, requesting that it be carried out in accordance with the agreement.
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the Polish force, and indeed drafted many of them into Soviet units.  The Soviets responded to 
the Polish embassy’s note stating that as the remaining citizens of eastern Poland, referred to by 
the Soviets as the western districts of Ukraine and Belorussia, had been granted Soviet 
citizenship by a decree from the Supreme Council of the USSR on 29 November 1939, they were 
no longer Polish citizens and were eligible to be drafted into the Red Army. This Soviet decree 
forced the peoples in the eastern part of Poland, without their consent, to lose their Polish 
citizenship.33 Second, the Soviets were assigning low priorities to the logistics of the Polish II 
Corps. With the Red Army’s need for material and Stalin’s distrust of the Poles, the II Corps was 
at the tail end of the USSR’s supply chain. This lack of support made it difficult for the Poles to 
train and impeded their ability to enter into combat operations. In response to these concerns, the 
Soviets suggested that the Poles get their equipment from the Western powers that were better 
able to supply them.34 Things became worse in 1942, when the Soviets cut the rations allotted to 
the II Corps, stating that they should go to Soviet units fighting at the front. In all, Anders Army 
had its rations cut to half its official size, which did not take into account the large numbers of 
Polish civilians that had become dependent on the army’s rations.35 As a result, starvation began 
to affect members of the Polish camps, with upwards of 100 people dying every day.36
With this lack of action and delays in forming a functioning combat unit, many of the 
more committed Poles requested to be transferred to Polish units in the West which were already 
  
Throughout 1942, mostly due to the Soviets’ lack of supplies, the II Corps was unable to reach 
operational readiness.  
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engaged in fighting German forces. The Soviets, insisting the bulk of the Polish Army should be 
kept for use in the Soviet Union,37 refused to allow these volunteers to leave USSR and join the 
existing and currently fighting Polish Armed Forces in the West. This can be seen as Soviet 
reluctance to lose their de-facto control over the II Corps by allowing the best and brightest to 
slip away to the West. Another problem emerged upon the discovery that not all of the Poles in 
the Soviet labor system had been released, despite Stalin’s blanket amnesty of all Poles in the 
Soviet Union. It came to light that some administrators of Soviet Gulags were not willing to 
release their Polish prisoners as they required the slave labor to meet Soviet production quotas.  
Molotov stated on 15 November 1941, to the Polish ambassador who raised the question of the 
Poles still in Soviet labor camps that as the Polish Corps forming in the USSR was not yet active 
against the Germans, the needs of USSR meant that Poles in the Soviet Union must work where 
and when they were needed to aid the war effort.38
With the growing agitation and dissatisfaction of the Polish II Corps, as well as the 
changing fortunes of the Eastern Front, Stalin began to view the Polish troops as non-vital and a 
drain on the Soviet war effort.  As early as fall of 1941, Sikorski foresaw the problems with 
creating a Polish Army in the USSR and began planning to move most of, if not all of the force, 
to the British controlled Middle East. Fear of Soviet treachery combined with the material 
support of the Western Allies made the transfer all the more appealing.
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attempts to control Poland after the war. Better, Stalin decided, to allow the II Corps to be 
transferred to the West, thus keeping them far away from their Polish homeland. In accordance 
with this line of thinking, on 18 March 1942, with the Soviet authorities unable to provide 
adequate rations for the Polish Army, which was sharing its limited food supply with a growing 
number of Polish civilians, flocking to the Polish military for aid after being released from Soviet 
prisons and camps, Stalin made his decision. He agreed to move a portion of the Polish 
formation as a military force to Iran along with over 41,000 civilians.40
In July, under pressure from the Western Allies, Stalin agreed to allow the remainder of 
the Poles to be moved to Iran, effectively transferring control of the II Corps from the Soviets to 
the British.
  
41 Throughout March and April of 1942, the Polish forces were transferred by the 
Soviets across the Caspian Sea to the port of Pahlavi in Iran. For most of the Polish soldiers and 
civilians, their hardships were not over. The Soviets and the British, either lacking or 
withholding the transportation needed to get the Poles to their marshaling grounds in the Middle 
East, left the Poles to their own devices to get to their destination and most were forced to walk 
or hitchhike through Central Asia.42
As the transfer of the soldiers began, the core of what would become the II Polish Corps 
had already been fighting the Germans for some time in North Africa. Made up from Poles who 
had made their way to French-controlled Syria after the fall of Poland and subsequently British 
controlled Egypt after the fall of France, the newly reformed 1st Polish Independent Carpathian 
Brigade was at first earmarked for operations in Greece and the Balkans.
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to the sudden appearance of Erwin Rommel and his Afrika Korps in the North African desert. In 
late August 1941, the unit was shipped to the besieged port city of Tobruk, where for the next 
few months they held one of the fortresses most vulnerable sectors against repeated German and 
Italian attacks.44 Having emerged victorious at Tobruk the brigade was withdrawn back to the 
Middle East to provide a battle hardened cadre for the recently arrived Anders’ Army.45
By 1944, the Polish government was under tremendous pressure to put the II Corps into 
battle. Having refused Stalin’s request to send a division to the Eastern Front, Stalin accused the 
Poles of being unwilling to fight, despite their exemplary service on many other fronts.
  
46 
Additionally with the eastern portions of Poland being offered up to the Soviets, it was 
imperative that the II Corps be put into action, to further show the contributions that Poland was 
making to the defeat of Germany. Their chance came with the Allied invasion of Italy. Initially, 
the Poles had been in favor of Churchill’s proposed strategy of a landing in the Balkans, the true 
so-called, soft underbelly of Europe, as this would have been the closest direct route to their 
homeland, with the chance to perhaps even beat the Red Army to the Polish frontier. When the 
decision was made that Italy, not the Balkans, would be the Allies’ target, the Poles reluctantly 
put the II Corps at the Allies disposal.47
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forces had been bloodily repulsed.48 In May, Anders’ Army was given the option of leading the 
next attack, while at the same time, being told they had the right to refuse due to the enormous 
casualties he was expected to take in an assault on the monastery.49
After a first failed attempt, on 17 May, the Poles again attacked the massif. Through a 
tremendous hail of artillery, grenades, and small arms fire, the Poles finally managed, after a day 
of fighting, to clear the monastery of its defenders, the elite 1st and 3rd Fallschirmjäger 
regiments.
 Anders however saw this as a 
golden political opportunity with immense propaganda value. If the Poles could take the 
monastery where no other nation’s troops had been able, they would bring Poland’s cause - 
currently so hard pressed - to the forefront of world opinion.  
50 In doing so, they had taken over 4000 casualties, including 1000 dead.51
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they had achieved a major victory, their losses had been too heavy, and they were taken off the 
line for rest and resupply. With the June 1944 Normandy invasion, the Italian campaign became 
a secondary theater of operations, and many divisions were taken from Italy and sent to France. 
The II Polish Corps remained engaged in heavy fighting throughout the rest of 1944 into 1945, 
leading the Allied drive up the Italian peninsula. Anders’ Army ended their war on 2 May 1945 
in Northern Italy. Yet, the Poles received little credit for their exploits in Italy after Monte 
Casino; by this time they had become a political liability for their rabid hate of the Soviets and 
their system, of which many members of the II Corps had firsthand experience. By the later parts 
49
 Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed, 469. 
50
Koskodan, No Greater Ally, 127-130. 
51
 Zaloga, The Polish Army: 1939-1945, 20. 
80 
 
 
of the war, it was noted by observers that they were visibly more concerned with Soviet troop 
movements in Poland than in those of their German opponents.52
Of all Poland’s military forces active during the war their Air Force has received the 
most, yet still limited, publicity. After escaping Poland and making their way to France, the 
majority of the Polish pilots continued on to the United Kingdom, as the Royal Air Force was 
seen to be preferable to the dated French Air Force.
 
53 Despite their admirable performance in the 
defense of Poland and their desire to continue the fight against the Germans with the Western air 
forces, German propaganda had painted the Polish pilots as backwards and amateurs. The British 
further hindered the integration of Polish pilots into the RAF by forcing them to confirm to 
Commonwealth guidelines, including an oath of allegiance to the King of England.54 When the 
Battle of France began, those Poles who had managed to join foreign squadrons were immensely 
frustrated by the Western Allies’ use of air power. The Poles saw the tactics and operations of 
the West to be inferior to the Germans, but their observations were not taken seriously by the 
Allied air command. The rapid retreat of the Allied armies and the generally chaotic course of 
the campaign also hampered the usefulness of the air support. Nevertheless, some 133 Poles flew 
in the battle shooting down over 50 German planes with a loss of only nine pilots.55
As the Battle of France ended, the Polish airmen made their way across the channel to the 
United Kingdom. Desperate for men, the RAF now dropped its hindering requirements for Poles 
to serve and began grouping the Poles into their own squadrons. Once again, the British initially 
viewed the Poles as ill trained, despite the fact they had more combat experience than any other 
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Allied pilots. Yet after the language barrier was broken and the Poles adapted to the constraints 
of the RAFs flight system, four Polish squadrons, 300, 301, 302, and 303, were made 
operational.56 During the Battle of Britain these Polish squadrons were placed in one of the most 
dangerous areas in the whole of fighter command, flying in the most active period of the German 
air assault during the Battle of Britain. By the time the German onslaught died, the Polish 303rd 
squadron had become the highest scoring squadron of all the Allied forces with 126 victories, 
three times the RAF average, at a loss of 33 of their own pilots. For the remainder of the war, the 
Polish Air Force, due to its limited size, was kept under British command and participated in 
bombing missions over Germany, close air support, convoy security, transportation, and fighter 
cover for various amphibious landings in Europe.57
The Polish Navy largely escaped destruction at the hands of the Germans in 1939 due to 
the foresight of Operation Peking. Peking was the Polish government’s reaction to the naval and 
air superiority possessed by the Germans in the Baltic Sea. It was realized that if the Polish Navy 
remained in the Baltic, it would be destroyed. The best course of action was, therefore, to send 
the Polish Navy out into the Atlantic and to the ports of their ally Britain. As war clouds began to 
gather in August 1939, the operation was put into effect, with the fleet reaching the United 
Kingdom on 1 September the same day the German Wehrmacht crossed the Polish frontier.
 
58
The Polish Navy operated in a much more limited way than the other arms of Poland’s 
military. Consisting of only 27 ships, including 2 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 5 submarines and 11 
torpedo boats, some of which were given by the British who possessed spare ships they lacked 
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the manpower to crew them,59 it was unable to operate as a purely Polish force and instead joined 
with the British in their varied naval operations. Additionally, the Poles brought 14,000 tons of 
merchant shipping, in the form of the Polish Merchant Navy, to the Allied cause. The Polish 
Navy took part in the invasion of Norway, in which the destroyer Grom was sunk by German 
aircraft and where the submarine Orzel sank the German cruise liner turned troop transport Rio 
de Jenero.60 The high point of the Polish Navy during the war was when the destroyer Piorun 
was the Allied ship that located the German battleship Bismarck after Allied aircraft had lost 
sight of it on 25 May 1941. The small destroyer then began shelling the super battleship, all the 
while transmitting messages and hauling signal flags to let the Bismarck know that it was a 
Polish ship that was firing on them until the arrival of Royal Navy forces when, out of 
ammunition and fuel from is “dual” with the German battleship, it was forced to return to port.61 
Both the Polish Navy and Merchant Marine served throughout the Battle of the Atlantic, making 
up parts of convoys across from the United States to the United Kingdom through the Arctic 
Circle to the USSR, losing seventeen ships in the process.62 They also joined with the Allied 
fleets to provide cover for numerous amphibious landings including Norway, Dieppe, North 
Africa, Sicily, Italy, and Normandy.63
An additional and often overlooked contribution of the Polish government is that, while 
fighting for their political and military survival, they allocated vast resources to bring to light the 
true horrors of the German occupation of Europe. Indeed, the Polish Government-in-Exile, due 
to its extensive intelligence network on the continent and its ability to communicate with the 
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Home Army inside occupied Poland, was the first to reveal what would become known as the 
Holocaust to the outside world. In a note delivered to the governments of the United Nations on 
10 December 1942, Polish ambassador to England Count Raczynski described in great detail the 
German extermination of European Jews. He described unequivocally in the document that: 
“new methods of mass slaughter applied during the last few months confirm the fact that the 
German authorities aim with systematic deliberation at the total extermination of the Jewish 
population.”64 Due to the bravery of men like Jan Karski and Witold Pilecki who had infiltrated a 
Nazi sorting facility65 and volunteered to be interned in Auschwitz respectively,66
On 18 January 1943, the government-in-exile was the first to demand that the Allies 
attempt to halt the German extermination of Europe’s Jews. They demanded to the Allied 
council that the Allies should begin reprisal bombings into Germany, press Berlin to let the Jews 
leave German controlled countries, and demand that neutral nations take in the Jews. The Poles 
came close to demanding reprisals against German POWs and German nationals in Allied 
nations, but halted as this would have been a violation of international law. The British Foreign 
Minister Eden rejected the Polish proposal, only offering vague promises to intervene in neutral 
countries.
 the Polish 
Government-in-Exile provided proof of the German atrocities and a timeline of the adoption and 
implementation of the final solution.  
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What the London Poles thought was their greatest claim to legitimacy was the fact that 
the overwhelming majority of the resistance inside occupied Poland recognized them as the 
legitimate Polish government.68 The state of the resistance in Poland differed from anywhere else 
in Europe. Though their country was occupied, the Germans had not declared war on Poland, and 
the Poles had never formally surrendered.69 Therefore, no collaboration government emerged in 
Poland; rather, the Germans ruled it as a colonial possession. Instead, a new underground society 
was formed by the Poles as the ultimate form of resistance. It set up primary schools, 
universities, theaters, symphonies, newspapers, courts, and radio - all things banned by the 
Germans - in an attempt to keep Polish culture alive.70 The underground’s military arm, the 
Armia Krajowa (Home Army), was one of the largest underground movements of the Second 
World War, one that saw the government-in-exile as legitimate and took its orders from 
London.71
During the early stages of the war, after the German invasion of the USSR brought all of 
Poland under their control, the Home Army began a campaign of sabotage against German 
railways in Poland, damaging almost 200 trains in 1943 alone. The resistance’s skill at such 
operations resulted in a plan to synchronize the disruption of all railway lines going through 
Poland to the eastern front, over which 85% of German manpower was carried east. The plan 
was approved by Sikorski, but when he presented the idea to Stalin, the Soviet leader did not 
even bother to respond. Another method of sabotage was the resistance cells set up inside of 
factories producing war materials for the German military. These cells sabotaged what they 
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could, but more importantly, they managed to divert what materials and arms they could to the 
Home Army’s supply stores.72
The underground also initiated a policy of setting up resistance cells inside of the German 
concentration camps located in Poland, providing links to the outside world. They primarily 
engaged in sneaking food and medicine into the camps, but also targeted the most sadistic Kapos 
(prisoner supervisors), SS guards, and informants using methods such as typhus infected lice and 
planting evidence to get the offending Kapo or informant killed.
 
73
For the most part, the Home Army initially stayed away from attacking the German 
forces directly, fearing reprisals on Polish civilians, such as those that occurred when the less 
“sentimental” Soviet-backed Partisans attacked the Germans head on.
  
74 In 1943, as the German 
terror campaign against the Polish people was increased, the Home Army responded in kind, 
becoming more aggressive and launching a campaign of targeted assassinations.  The 
assassinations focused on Poles collaborating with the Germans, like the Polish actor turned Nazi 
propagandist Igo Sym, Poles who exposed Jews to the German occupiers, and Gestapo officials 
such as Franz Kutschera, the Gestapo chief in Warsaw.75 Attempts were even made on Hans 
Frank the Governor-General of occupied Poland's “Generalgouvernement” territory.76
Most importantly, the Home Army trained and marshaled their forces for the great 
uprising to come, where they would attempt to free their nation themselves, before the Soviets 
arrived to enforce their own brand of “liberation”. Polish officers and NCOs from the pre-war 
Polish Army, supplemented by Poles trained by the British Special Operations Executive and 
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airdropped into occupied Poland,77
Though their two Polish Corps were contributing greatly to the war effort, the Three 
Great Powers were, in effect, determining Poland’s future unilaterally, without the voice of the 
government-in-exile that considered itself Poland’s legitimate government. Yet the London Poles 
still had their control of the Armia Krajowa, the Polish Home Army. To demonstrate the power 
of the organization and the control that the London Poles still had over their nation, they 
developed a strategy where by the Home Army would stage an uprising to wrest control of 
Warsaw from the Germans as the Red Army approached.
 formed the resistance into military units and educated them in 
the methods of war.  
78
The Uprising, part of a series of actions against the German occupation in the latter half 
of 1944 codenamed Akcja Burza, Operation Tempest,
  By accomplishing this, the Soviets 
would enter a city already liberated from within and under the control of the government-in-
exile. This would legitimate both the London Poles’ and the sovereignty of the Polish state.  
79 began on 1 August 1944, triggered by the 
sight of the Red Army on the eastern banks of the Vistula and urgings to rebel broadcasted by 
Moscow radio.80 The Home Army, under their commander Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, had 
amassed around 40,000 combatants for the uprising in Warsaw, armed with a mix of captured, 
airdropped, and homemade weapons.81 In the first four days of the Uprising, the Poles managed 
to capture much of the city center, including the historic Old Town, but found stiff resistance in 
the outlying areas of the city.82
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airdrops,83 including they hoped, the Polish airborne brigade, and the Poles settled in to hold their 
position until the Red Army entered the city.  
 
Map 3. “Warsaw Uprising Day 5 August 1944” Armia Krajowa w Dokumentach, Vol. IV., 
http://www.polishresistance-ak.org/images/Warsaw_5.08.1944.jpg (accessed April 1, 2013) 
 
Soon after the uprising began, Soviet forces halted their advance 10km outside of 
Warsaw; The Red Army did not attempt further operations until January of 1945. Furthermore, 
they refused to supply the Home Army or support them with aircraft or artillery.84
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Government-in-Exile to engage in operations to relive the Home Army.85 Stalin responded the 
following day by saying that the information Churchill had received on the Warsaw Uprising 
was incorrect. Instead of the city being transformed into a warzone, he stated that the Home 
Army was merely a few detachments of fighters masquerading themselves as whole divisions. 
The bands, said Stalin, had no guns, aircraft, or tanks with which to fight and therefore he could 
not imagine that they could have recaptured the city of Warsaw from four German armored 
divisions.86
On 9 August in a conversation between the new Prime Minister of the government-in-
exile Mikolajczyk and Stalin, the former pleaded desperately with Stalin to send aid to the Home 
Army and to reinitiate Red Army operations against the Germans across the Vistula.  
Mikolajczyk stated that since the start of the uprising, the Home Army had been holding bridge 
corridors across the Vistula River in preparation for linking up with the Red Army, but these 
corridors were in serious danger of being overrun. Stalin responded by stating that the Poles had 
begun their operations in Warsaw prematurely, despite the calls from Moscow for the national 
uprising,
  
87 and that the Red Army was in no position to cross the Vistula. Despite Mikolajczyk’s 
further pleas for support, Stalin stonewalled his requests and instead changed the discussion to 
the Committee of National Liberation.88
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made his true intentions known in a telegram to Mikolajczyk. He wrote that after closer study the 
Soviet High Command determined that since the Warsaw “adventure” was launched without the 
Soviet’s knowledge, there was nothing that the Red Army could do to support the uprising. 
Consequently, he claimed that the entire enterprise was a useless move that resulted in the deaths 
of the city’s inhabitants. Because of this and the attacks by the Polish press on the Soviets for 
their “legitimate” lack of action, the USSR disclaimed any responsibility for the uprising and any 
fault for its outcome.89
On 22 August, Stalin replied negatively to Roosevelt and Churchill’s request for Soviet 
aid to the Home Army. He claimed that the Home Army was led by power seeking criminals 
who had brought the fury of the Nazi war machine down on the residents of Warsaw. In addition, 
the uprising was causing an undo amount of focus by the Wehrmacht to be directed at Warsaw, 
resulting in the increase of German activity in the Warsaw area. This made it impossible for the 
Red Army to liberate the Polish capital at the present time. Indeed the Soviets, it was claimed, 
had to repulse German counter attacks in the area rather than getting the rest and resupply that 
was necessary to reinitiate offensive operations.
  
90 By this point the Germans had responded to 
the uprising in force. After being reinforced by several SS units including the SS Dirlewanger, a 
penal unit comprised of criminals,91 and the elite Hermann Göring Fallschirm-Panzer Division,92
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the use of heavy artillery and close air support to demolish the areas occupied by the resistance. 
The Poles, lacking any defense against such methods could only sit and take the bombardment.93
 In the weeks that followed, due to the lack of direct Soviet support, numerous requests 
were made by the Western Allies for use of Soviet aerodromes to support the uprising by air; the 
Allied planes needed to land and refuel to make the round trip. The Soviets denied access saying 
that they had already tried airdrops into Warsaw and those had failed causing the vast majority of 
the supplies to fall into German hands. This despite Mikolajczyk’s denial that any airdrops had 
been made by the Soviets.
 
94 Though the Allies’ called for the Soviets to relent throughout the rest 
of August and September, Stalin still refused the use of Soviet aerodromes until the very end. For 
over two months, the London Poles tried desperately to get the Western Allies to lend aid to the 
uprising, but their pleas fell on deaf ears; the Allies were not willing to cross Stalin for the Polish 
resistance fighters. As Polish troops in the West died helping close the Falaise Gap and jumped 
into enemy positions in Arnhem to rescue the British Airborne, the Allies merely launched 
complaints to the USSR in their attempt to save the people of Warsaw from German retribution. 
After holding out for 63 days, the Armia Krajowa had lost over 18,000 fighters, and another 
250,000 civilians were killed, most in acts of German reprisal, with 85 percent of Warsaw 
leveled systematically.95
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Home Army,96 the resistance capitulated to the Germans, and the fighters shipped off to various 
concentration and death camps throughout the Reich.97
The Warsaw Uprising was the last desperate gamble to turn Poland’s fortunes and save 
her from being offered-up to Stalin by her supposed allies. The attempt by the London Poles to 
underscore their authority backfired spectacularly due to their underestimation of Stalin. The 
man who had ordered the Katyn massacre had no qualms with allowing the Germans to root out 
the Home Army, saving the NKVD the trouble. As if by Déjà vu, the London Poles, again 
overestimated the willingness of the Western Allies to stand for Poland; they had not done it 
against their enemy Hitler; they would not do it against their ally Stalin. The Warsaw Uprising 
was the London Poles’ swan song, and the defeat of the Home Army signaled that any power 
held by the government-in-exile within Poland was lost.  
  This was the great mortal blow to the 
London Poles: Their main political and military asset had been destroyed, they had seemingly 
been abandoned by their supposed allies, their capital was in ruins, and their nation was 
defenseless against the Soviet “liberators.” 
The various actions and battles in which the Polish Army, Navy, Air Force and Home 
Army struggled during the Second World War does much to prove the fact that the Second 
Republic was still striving for Allied victory over the Germans long after September 1939. The 
importance of the Polish Armed Forces to the war effort belies their size. Though vastly outsized 
by the Red Army, the Poles were, nevertheless, present at many of the decisive points in the 
European War. In the Battle of Britain, the skill of the Polish pilots helped put the narrow margin 
of victory in the Allies favor. At Mount Ormal, the Polish 1st Armored Division plugged the 
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Falaise Gap allowing the destruction of much of the Wehrmacht in Normandy. The Polish 
Airborne pulled the remnants of the British airborne from destruction at Arnhem. The II Corps 
walked through the wilds of Central Asia to take Monte Casino and help break the Gothic Line. 
The Polish Home Army provided the Allies with the majority of the intelligence gained about the 
German actions on the continent. Yet, while the Polish servicemen were fighting, their sacrifices 
were being ignored at the great conferences. Despite the London Poles belief that the Polish 
Armed Forces were proof of their legitimacy, no matter what impact the Poles had on the war, 
the Red Army’s numbers proved to be the more convincing bargaining chip. 
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CHAPTER V  
Katyn  
1943 
 
During the Soviet Union’s invasion of Poland in September 1939, the Red Army had met 
with little resistance from the defending Polish Army. With the Poles engaged with the Germans 
in the West, their high command, not realizing what was happening, not understanding whether 
the purpose of the Soviet intervention was to aid or hinder the Poles, and not wanting to 
antagonize the USSR, had not authorized its troops to attack the Soviets.1 This resulted in 
massive capitulations by encircled Polish troops; in all, between 250,000 to 450,000 Poles were 
captured by the Red Army.2 Two days after the Soviet invasion, on 19 September 1939, Lavrenti 
Beria, head of the NKVD, in an effort to manage the growing number of Polish prisoners, issued 
orders to create the Administration for Affairs of Prisoners of War and Internees, the UPV. 
Under NKVD control, eight camps were constructed in eastern Belorussia based on the GULAG 
model. The UPV would put the POWs to work and begin a political indoctrination campaign, as 
well as gather information on POWs about their membership in pre-war political parties, to 
determine who might be a threat to the USSR after hostilities had ceased.3 After the secession of 
hostilities, the NKVD began to arrest and interrogate Polish officers who had escaped capture 
during the September campaign and had not managed to go into hiding. On 3 December 1939, 
Beria, on the command of Stalin, ordered the arrest of “all registered regular officers of the 
former Polish Army.”4
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arrested since the 3 December order. Additionally, Beria decided that officers would remain in 
the labor camps while the rank and file POWs were sent home.5 These camps also began to be 
filled with members of the Polish Intelligentsia, who had been rounded up and arrested by the 
NKVD as threats to Soviet control over the country.6
While at the camps, from October 1939 to February 1940, the Polish prisoners were 
subjected to interrogations and near constant political agitation by the NKVD.  The orders 
handed down from Beria on 8 October 1939 contained explicit directions about how the NKVD 
should interact with the prisoners. They stated that the NKVD should begin to create a system of 
informants among the POWs in order to root out any counter-revolutionary groups that might 
exist. The monitoring of the mood and moral of the officers was also a high priority, to better 
gauge the overall mood of the Polish people. Files on the various prisoners were to be made, 
focusing on past employment, membership in organizations, and political beliefs.
  
7
                                                 
5
 Cienciala et al., Katyn,34. 
  The prisoners 
expected that they would soon be released and allowed to return home, but in reality, the 
interviews were actually a selection process to determine who would survive, and who would 
perish. On 5 March 1940, four members of the Soviet Politburo - Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, 
and Mikoyan - issued an order to execute over 25,000 Polish "nationalists and 
counterrevolutionaries" kept by the NKVD at camps and prisons in the USSR. The memorandum 
to Stalin by Beria stated that the officers and men in the camps were “sworn enemies of the 
Soviet Union,” who are continuing their counter-revolutionary practices and espionage. Due to 
the threat these men represented they were to be tried, without their knowledge and sentenced to 
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death, to be carried out in secret by the NKVD on the grounds of anti-Soviet agitation and 
preparation to “enter actively into battle against Soviet Power” upon release.8
Why such an order was issued by the Soviet government is a hotly debated issue. The 
most compelling argument is that Stalin ordered the execution in an effort to deprive any future 
Polish state of a large portion of its talent.
  
9 By murdering the cream of the Polish officer corps, 
Stalin sought to permanently cripple the Polish military. Furthermore, by weakening the Polish 
people in this way, Stalin could be certain that any revived Polish state, which would assuredly 
be unfriendly to the USSR, would not possess the skill or leadership to challenge Soviet control 
of Eastern Poland which Stalin was determined to keep.10 Another reason for the mass execution 
was the Soviet high commands fear that the Polish officers represented a threat to Soviet control 
of Poland, as the officers would undoubtedly form the core of any resistance operations mounted 
by the Polish people. Indeed, in Beria’s memorandum, he states that “in all these counter-
revolutionary organizations [encountered in former Poland], an active, guiding role is played by 
former officers of the former Polish Army and former police and gendarmes.”11
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to the Soviets so close to where the battle lines might be drawn, may have influenced Stalin to 
order the executions.12
 The execution process was carried out by the NKVD between April and May 1940, 
primarily in the Katyn forest outside of Smolensk. The first recorded transport of prisoners to 
Katyn took place on 5 April 1940, described in a message to the Deputy Commissar of Internal 
Affairs Merkulov. The victims were listed on manifests in a clear and precise method as they 
departed on trains to Katyn. Most were listed by name, rank, father, birthday, and Prisoner 
number.
 
13 The total number of victims is estimated to be at about 22,000 Polish citizens, with 
those who died specifically in the Katyn forests numbered approximately 14,500 victims.14 They 
included an admiral, two generals, 24 colonels, 79 lieutenant colonels, 258 majors, 654 captains, 
17 naval captains, 3,420 NCOs, 7 chaplains, 3  landowners, a prince, 43 officials, 85 privates, 
131 refugees, 20 university professors, 300 physicians; 300 lawyers, engineers, and teachers; 
more than 100 writers and journalists and about 200 pilots.”15 The remaining 7.5 thousand were 
killed and disposed of at several NKVD prisons.16
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was far more practical: the Nagant revolvers with which they had initially begun the executions 
had far too much recoil for prolonged and repeated use.17
The actual process of the killings was faceless and methodical. The prisoners would be 
driven in a bus to a building in the forest. One by one they would be taken into the building past 
running mechanical fans designed to help drown out the gunshots. They would then be forced to 
enter a room which had been sound-proofed and stood in front of a sandbag wall were they were 
shot in the back of the neck from behind by a man waiting in an alcove. The bodies would then 
be carried out the back door to waiting trucks, which would take them to a mass grave deep in 
the forest.
  
18 The process was repeated hundreds of times a day for weeks, only ceasing once for 
the May Day holiday. The murders were completed on 22 May, and the various prisons and 
camps were ordered to send the murdered prisoners’ data cards to Moscow and report on the 
effectiveness of the Poles pre-death labor in keeping their upkeep expenses at a minimum.19
With German invasion of the USSR in June 1941, the killing site in Katyn was overrun 
by the German Army and the mass graves of the Polish officer corps were located behind the 
German lines. Additionally, with the signing of the Sikorski-Mayski Agreement on 30 July 1941, 
the USSR and Poland had become allies, facilitating the formation of the Polish II Corps. With 
this decision came Stalin’s amnesty for Polish POWs and citizens in Soviet hands. As Ander’s 
Army assembled, questions about missing officers began to be raised by the Polish government. 
 With 
the executions complete, the Soviets though their problems with the Polish officers were over 
and buried.  
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While the USSR gave excuses for the missing Poles, the Germans were becoming aware of the 
Soviets’ crimes. Sometime in late 1942 and early 1943, a German intelligence officer, Rudolf 
von Gersdorff, received reports about mass graves of Polish soldiers in the Smolensk 
countryside.20
The Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels saw this discovery as the perfect tool to 
drive a wedge between Poland, the Western Allies, and the USSR, as well as to highlight the 
Nazi propaganda about the horrors of Bolshevism and the Western Allies subservience to it. It 
would also serve as a major moral weapon, which was sorely needed after the German 6th 
Army’s surrender at Stalingrad two months before. Goebbels therefore gave instructions to the 
German press to make the widest possible use of the propaganda material.
 After an investigation, they discovered the first of the many mass graves in the 
Katyn forest.   
21  On 13 April 1943, 
the German government, through Radio Berlin, announced to the world their discovery of the 
mass graves containing 12,000 massacred Polish officers. In the broadcast, Goebbels claimed 
that German forces had uncovered the mass execution site in occupied Russia, 16 kilometers 
west of Smolensk. They described a pit, 28 meters long and 16 meters wide with a mass of 3000 
bodies’ twelve layers deep.22
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the Soviets in 1939.23
To validate their claims, the Germans quickly brought in a commission consisting of 
twelve forensic experts and staffs from German-occupied Europe and Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Croatia, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and the 
neutral country of Sweden.
 The Germans stated that the officers were murdered by the Soviets in the 
spring of 1940.  
24
As expected, the Soviets vehemently denied the accusations. The Soviet government 
issued a communiqué attacking the German propaganda on 15 April 1943. It claimed that the 
statements issued by the German propaganda department were vicious lies. The Soviets argued 
that the Germans were responsible for the heinous crime, having caught the Polish officers 
working on road building operations near Smolensk in the June, 1941, invasion. In their response 
on 15 April, to the initial German broadcast of 13 April, the Soviet Information Bureau, stated 
that "[...]Polish prisoners-of-war who in 1941 were engaged in construction work west of 
Smolensk and who [...] fell into the hands of the German-Fascist hangmen [...]." In addition, the 
communiqué argued that by blaming the Soviets, the Germans were covering up their own 
crimes and attempting to discredit the USSR on the international stage.
 Unsurprisingly, albeit correctly, the German directed commission 
found that the mass executions were carried out by their enemies, the Soviets, in 1940, and 
condemned the USSR for its actions.  
25
On 16 April, the London Poles issued a statement describing their search for the missing 
Polish officers. When given their locations at the beginning of 1940 by the Soviets and 
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comparing it with the lack of officers reporting for service to the Polish II Corps, the 
government-in-exile was seriously concerned. Additionally, lists of officers taken prisoner by the 
Red Army, compiled by fellow POWs showed conclusively that the vast majority of officers 
were missing and unaccounted for after the spring of 1940.26 This evidence flew in the face of the 
statements that the Soviets had issued, assuring the London Poles that all prisoners in their 
custody had been released. The government-in-exile’s statement ended by saying that the Poles 
were accustomed to German lies and that they possessed irrefutable evidence of German mass 
murder in occupied Poland (the Holocaust), but the Germans detailed description of the massacre 
site, along with how well the their information matched up with the Poles’ own, the government-
in-exile’s concern for the whereabouts of their officers warranted further investigation.27
Stalin responded in a letter to Churchill on 21 April 1943, stating the fact that the Poles 
were questioning the Soviet’s claims of innocence at a time when the Germans were accusing the 
USSR of this crime was “indubitable” evidence of contact and collaboration between the London 
Poles and the Nazis. This, Stalin claimed, necessitated the breaking-off of relations between the 
Soviet Union and the London Poles.
 The 
London Poles then requested an examination of the site by the International Red Cross of 
Geneva. 
28
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  On 25 April, Molotov contacted the Polish government 
stating that, due to their recent behavior and attacks on the USSR as well as the “obvious” 
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military relations with the Polish government in London.29 On the same day, Churchill contacted 
Stalin in an effort to forestall the break in relations. He stated that he had met and discussed with 
Sikorski his appeal to the International Red Cross. Churchill insisted that Sikorski had made the 
appeal to the Red Cross independently and that the Germans had followed suit as a propaganda 
tool. Furthermore, he informed Stalin that Sikorski was a committed patriot who had had no 
contact with the Germans and additionally was willing to cease his calls for an investigation in 
order to keep friendly relations with the USSR. Churchill continued by saying that any break in 
the Allied bloc would only serve to assist Hitler and play directly into the overall plan of the 
propaganda attack.30
On 23 May 1943, Molotov contacted the Polish ambassador to Moscow Tadeusz Romer 
with the USSR’s decision to break off diplomatic relations with the London Poles. In the note, 
Molotov stated that the break was due to the government-in-exiles slanderous and pro-fascist 
remarks on Soviet guilt of the Katyn incident. He continued by claiming that the London 
government was in collusion with the Germans due to their simultaneous call for an investigation 
into the killings. Due to the anti-Soviet hostility expressed by the government-in-exile and their 
accord with the Nazis, the Soviet Union could no longer maintain diplomat relations with the 
 Despite this and other pleas, Stalin would have none of it. The discovery of 
Katyn and the London Pole’s inquiries provided a convenient reason for Stalin to break with the 
London Poles. The Polish Government-in-Exile had become a thorn in his side, unwilling to bow 
to his demands. Their continued resistance was an impediment to his desires for post-war Eastern 
Europe. Katyn gave him the excuse he needed to brush them aside.  
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London Poles.31
To this end, on 4 May 1943, Stalin, in a letter to Churchill, wrote that due to the anti-
Soviet actions of the London Poles, as well as its perceived pro-Nazi leanings, he had begun 
forming a new Polish government in the USSR. He further stated that he wished in the future to 
consolidate the government-in-exile with his new government into the future ruling body of 
Poland.
 With Molotov’s note Stalin finally had the political cover to begin his campaign 
of isolating and sidelining the London Poles in earnest. From this point on Stalin, would cease to 
try and win territorial acquisitions from the government-in-exile and would instead begin to push 
the Western Allies to recognize a communist Polish government set up by the Soviets as the 
legitimate head of the Polish state.  
32 With the crisis of recognition now hitting its climax, further tragedy befell the London 
Poles. On 4 July 1943, on his return trip from inspecting the Polish troops in the Middle East, 
Sikorski, along with his daughter and chief of staff, were killed when their airplane crashed 
shortly after takeoff from Gibraltar Airport.33
The replacement of Sikorski proved a very difficult endeavor. He alone had been able to 
control Polish hatred of the Soviets and therefore work personally with Stalin. The split between 
the pre-war opposition and the Sanacja had never fully been mended, and the search for a 
replacement opened up the same wounds that had existed during the formation of the 
 This was perhaps “the” turning point for the 
London Poles. With the death of Sikorski, the Poles had lost their most prestigious leader, and no 
subsequent Pole would have the influence he had had on the Allied camp. As went Sikorski, so 
went Poland’s power amongst the Allies.  
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government-in-exile. After Sikorski’s death, the decision was made to separate the positions that 
he had held, that of Prime Minister and commander-in-chief. This was an effort to separate the 
military from politics and disperse the control of Poland’s Armed Forces away from one 
individual.34 Originally, the fiercely anti-Soviet General Sosnkowski was the choice for 
commander-in-chief with Anders proposed as a suitable alternative. Anders, with his history of 
butting heads with the Soviets, was seen by the Allies as unfit for the position. Sosnkowski was 
acceptable, they agreed, if his appointment was mirrored by a more democratic Prime Minister. 
For PM, the choice was Mikolajczyk, a member of the pre-war opposition and the leader of 
largest political party, the Peasant party. He accepted the offer of PM with the condition that the 
Constitution, still that of 1935, be changed to limit the power of the executive.35
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  Furthermore, he 
set about to decentralize the military power of the commander-in-chief, removing the position 
from the political cabinet as well as his command of the Polish Home Army to the defense 
minister. The Polish military and underground met the news of Sikorski’s replacement with 
anger and apprehension. They did not trust the new government, angry that the power of the 
much-loved Sosnkowski was taken away and that the pre-war Constitution was, in effect, 
rewritten. Another damaging factor to the new government was that with the breaking of 
relations between the London Poles and the USSR, they were entirely dependent on the goodwill 
of the Western Allies, Roosevelt and Churchill in particular, to act as intermediaries, this at a 
time when the Poles were becoming more and more of a liability to inter-Allied unity in the eyes 
of the West.  
35
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As the fortunes of war turned, the Red Army began to push the Germans back. After the 
liberation of Smolensk and the Katyn area on October, 1943, the Soviets began a massive cover-
up operation designed to hide the truth about the killings and ensure that the world “knew” that it 
was the Nazis who had killed the Polish officers. To facilitate this, the Soviets initiated the 
leadingly named “Special Commission for Determination and Investigation of the Shooting of 
Polish Prisoners of War by German-Fascist Invaders in Katyn Forest” under Nikolai Burdenko. 
The Burdenko commission unsurprisingly concluded that the Germans had committed the crime 
in the fall of 1941. The commission’s report would be cited repeatedly as the “official” Soviet 
explanation until the admission of guilt by the Soviet government on 13 April 1990.36
In the meantime the growing Polish-Soviet crisis brought about by Katyn was beginning 
to threaten Western-Soviet relations when the Poles' importance to the Allied war effort started 
to diminish due to the entry of the military and industrial goliaths, the Soviet Union and the 
United States. The London Poles might have to be sacrificed for the sake of good relations 
between the West and the USSR. Even so Churchill, admitted on 15 April 1943, during a 
conversation with General Sikorski about the discovery of the mass graves that: "Alas, the 
German revelations are probably true. The Bolsheviks can be very cruel.
   
37 Indeed classified 
British documents stated that Soviet guilt was a "near certainty", but the alliance with the USSR 
was deemed to be more important than any moral issues; thus, the official documents and public 
accounts supported the Soviets, up to censoring any contradictory accounts in the government or 
the press.38
                                                 
36
 Cienciala et al., Katyn, 106. 
 In the United States, Franklin Roosevelt sent Navy Lieutenant Commander George 
Earle to investigate the Katyn murders. Earle’s report concluded that the Soviets, not the 
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Germans, were guilty of the crime. Roosevelt rejected the investigation’s conclusion and 
publicly declared that he was convinced of Nazi Germany's responsibility, He then ordered that 
Earle's report be suppressed, to the point of “banishing” Earle to American Samoa for his 
insistence that the report be made public.39
To add insult to injury, at the post-war Nuremberg Trials of the Major War Criminals 
before the International Military Tribunal, the USSR attempted to add the Katyn Massacre to the 
list of German war crimes. The inclusion embarrassed the Western judges as guilt for the crimes 
was still being contested in the Western media. The Soviets, on 14 February 1946 put it forward 
as one of the most heinous of the German crimes but were unable to prove that any of the 
German defendants had been involved with the killings.
  
40 The Burdenko commission, which the 
Soviets thought would prove their case was disallowed by the tribunal as it was seen as biased in 
favor of the USSR. Also, they managed to make sure that any evidence used by the defense that 
might incriminate the Soviets be disallowed.41 As such the U.S. and British judges dismissed the 
charges. That the Soviets might do something like this was a fear that had been voiced back in 
1943. British Undersecretary of State Alexander Cadogan stated “that we may eventually, by 
agreement and in collaboration with the Russians, proceed to the trial and perhaps execution of 
axis ‘war criminal’ while condoning this atrocity.”42
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  Despite the fact that the Allies possessed 
numerous and detailed reports and investigations, including the classified British documents and 
the American Earle report, the Western Allies sat in judgment alongside the Soviet’s, guilty of 
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many war crimes themselves, passing sentences on the Germans. The Allies said nothing; they 
were unwilling to anger the Soviets, a phrase that had become all too common for the Allies 
when dealing with Polish-Soviet relations throughout the war.  
The uncovering of the Katyn massacre proved to be another decisive moment in the 
demise of the Second Republic. Not only was it an unimaginable tragedy for the Polish people 
and Armed Forces, but the government-in-exile’s response to the discovery provided Stalin with 
the excuse he needed to finally sever diplomatic relations with the London Poles. This allowed 
Stalin the freedom to make his own bid for control of the Polish nation without having to placate 
the obstinate government-in-exile. Sikorski’s death compounded the problem; the Polish leader 
who possessed the respect of the Allies proved impossible to replace. Yet, as the break had 
already occurred between the Poles and the Soviets, there is not much evidence that even 
Sikorski could have helped rescue the situation. Perhaps more disturbing is the evidence that, 
from the beginning, the Western Allies, FDR, and Churchill in particular, possessed convincing 
evidence that the Soviets were responsible for the heinous crime. Nevertheless, even with this 
knowledge, they still sat and negotiated with Stalin at Tehran and Yalta and gave him control 
over Poland and Eastern Europe; such was the USSR’s importance to the war effort. 
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CHAPTER VI  
The Polish Problem  
Tehran: 1943 
 
The harsh truth for Poland was that as the Second World War went on the question of its 
future government and geography diminished in importance. The Western Allies saw ultimate 
victory and the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan to be their single most important 
objective. To achieve this victory, they needed the Soviet Union and its vast reserves of 
manpower. With this in mind, the West was willing to sacrifice part of, and eventually all of, 
Poland to satisfy Stalin’s demands. Though Polish troops would continue fighting and dying, 
playing critical parts in many of the wars most important battles, including the Battle of Britain, 
Monte Casino, and Operation Market Garden, the London Poles would not be allowed to 
participate in any conference that would affect the future of their nation, due to the insistence of 
Stalin.  
Since the Soviet government’s announcement on 6 January 1943 that they meant to 
permanently claim the areas of Poland they had occupied alongside the Germans, the 
government-in-exile had vigorously protested the Soviets actions as unacceptable.1
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 Though when 
in contact with the American and British governments they received sympathetic words, neither 
nation would take any action against the USSR due to the tremendous burden it was carrying of 
the allied war effort.  Despite this, the Poles kept up their resistance to the USSR’s territorial and 
claims. The London Poles remained convinced that they could not compromise on the shape of 
their eastern frontiers. They felt that they did not possess the constitutional right to cede territory 
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to the Soviets and that if they were to go ahead and do so they would lose the support of the 
Polish Army and people.2
With the discovery of the Katyn killing ground and the Soviets subsequent breaking off 
of relations with the London Poles, Prime Minister Mikolajczyk and British Foreign Minister 
Eden met to discuss the possibility of reestablishing relations between the government-in-exile 
and the USSR. Eden, contrary to his previous assurances of Poland’s post-war territorial 
integrity, pressed Mikolajczyk to give in to Soviet demands and accept concessions in the east in 
exchange for German territory. Mikolajczyk responded that while he was anxious to reestablish 
relations with the Soviets he was not willing to discuss concessions. He stated that he could not 
accede to the Soviets demands because, in his opinion, the Soviets did not just desire a piece of 
Polish territory, but control over the entire nation as a stepping stone for their goal of controlling 
Eastern Europe. He continued that as soon as Soviet forces entered Polish territory, he expected 
Stalin to unveil a communist Polish government to challenge the London Poles for post-war 
control of the nation.
  
3
 The London Poles, with their history of dealing with the Soviets before the war 
understood the goals of the USSR better that the Western Allies. As such they continued to resist 
Soviet demands even as the United States and the United Kingdom began to distance themselves 
from their previous statements on the Polish problem. The government-in-exile still thought that 
they would have a say in the final decision on post-war Poland, they felt that the Western Allies 
would eventually honor their promises and the fact that Polish military forces were currently 
engaging the Germans on several fronts would serve as a large bargaining tool in negotiations. 
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What the failed to realize is just how unimportant the Polish issue was to the West when 
compared with the Soviet contributions to the war effort. FDR especially, had made it clear in 
March 1943 that the Three Great Powers alone would decide the fate of Poland, and that they 
would not bargain with the Poles, but do what was best for the peace of the world.4
 The first of the three great conferences that would decide Poland’s fate was Tehran. On 
the 28 November 1943, Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt met in Tehran to discuss the future 
conduct of the war and to begin considering the shape of post-war Europe. This was Stalin’s first 
chance to enact his plan for Soviet control of Eastern Europe, including Poland, after the war. 
For Stalin and the Soviet Union, the conquest of Poland was among their oldest and consistent 
goals.
 The Poles 
would have to yield to Soviet demands. 
5 Poland, due to its size and geographic location, was the key to establishing communist 
control over Eastern Europe.  With this in mind, at the great conferences of the Second World 
War Stalin was determined to retain the territory that he had gained taken the Poles while allied 
Hitler, Stalin’s major aim in negotiations being Western recognition of these frontiers.6
Stalin’s diplomatic strategy was the traditional Soviet strategy, pressed from his position 
of strength. It was based on the Marxist principal of the inevitability of the West’s collapse and 
subsequent Soviet victory. This explains Stalin’s predatory instinct, where he managed to take 
advantage of every Western complacency and mistake, knowing that the West would allow it to 
happen. Realizing that the Western Allies were primarily interested in global peace he was able 
to use that desire to wring concessions advantageous to the USSR.
   
7
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States and the United Kingdom entered into negotiations on the future of Poland willing to give 
in the interest of a stable post war world, Stalin came to the table determined to wring every last 
concession possible from the Western Allies and the Poles in particular. 
At the conference, the topic of Poland and its post-war destiny was not the primary 
concern of the Big Three leaders. The main objective of the United States and Great Britain was 
to ensure the full cooperation and assistance of the Soviet Union in the execution of Allied war 
policies.8  The West was desperate to bring the Soviet Union’s massive military might to bear on 
the Germans in the most effective and coordinated method possible. Stalin agreed at the 
necessity, but with his own conditions. First, Roosevelt and Churchill would have to begin 
operations to support the communist partisans in Yugoslavia. Secondly, the West would have to 
express their support for the manipulation of the border between Poland and the USSR, in 
violation of a large number of agreements made with the Polish government. Most important, 
were the discussions on the opening of a second European front, and the coordination of the D-
Day landings with a massive Soviet offensive operation, which would come to be called 
Operation Bagration.9
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 This topic outshined the Polish question. The "Big Three" spent days 
arguing about when D-Day should take place, who should be its commander, and when the 
operations should begin. Throughout the conference, in what would come to be the norm for 
such meetings, Stalin dominated the discussion, using the Red Army’s great victory at the Battle 
of Kursk, its military might, and the key positions it held on the Eastern front, to ensure that his 
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demands were met.10 Poland was not the only state that Stalin was promised a free hand in at 
Tehran, Churchill, and Roosevelt also acquiesced to the Soviet Union forming puppet communist 
governments in Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Balkans, 
once they had been “liberated” by the Red Army. It became readily apparent to Stalin that the 
Western leaders were far too concerned about achieving victory in the war to risk upsetting him.  
Furthermore the West’s negative attitude towards the Poles, brought on by the government-in-
exile’s refusal to concede territory to the Soviets, encouraged Stalin to be uncompromising in his 
demands, knowing that the West would eventually pressure the poles into yielding in the name of 
Allied unity.11
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Map 4. "Map of Poland in 1945" 
Carr, Adam Wikipedia, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ 
commons/7/75/Map_of_Poland_%281945%29.png (accessed April 1, 2013). 
 
At the Tehran conference, Stalin and Churchill discussed privately their views on the 
Polish question. Churchill pointed out to Stalin that England had gone to war for the sake Polish 
national sovereignty and was as committed as ever to a strong and independent Poland. Yet, he 
stated, in contrast to previous guaranties to the London Poles, that the British had no particular 
attachment to any specific Polish frontier. He then pressed Stalin on his feelings toward a 
western Polish frontier on the Oder River, to which Stalin replied that he was in favor, yet he 
stated that the issue of Polish frontiers would require further thought.12
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 The American President 
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Franklin D. Roosevelt also spoke with Stalin privately on the issue of borders and on the 
principle of self-determination in regards to Poland. This discussion was particularly useful 
because it reveals Roosevelt‘s true feelings on the Polish issue, and helps to explain his 
reasoning for being so accommodating with Stalin, i.e. that both were primarily concerned with 
their own political issues, above all other matters. Roosevelt stated to Stalin that there was an 
American presidential election the next year and that six to seven million Poles lived in the 
United States. Roosevelt wanted their votes, and, therefore, even though he agreed with Stalin on 
issues regarding the post-war Polish borders, he could not participate in any public decision on 
them until after the election.13 Roosevelt then explained to Stalin that the American public 
demanded the right of the Poles to self-determination after the war, even though he thought that 
the Polish people would choose to join the USSR.14 Stalin agreed on “future expressions” of the 
“will of the people” within the Soviet system, but stated outright that he would not allow any 
form of international control. Stalin also stated that Roosevelt should have some propaganda 
work done to convince the American people that the Poles would be better off under Soviet rule 
and that they would be able to express their will in accordance with the Soviet constitution.15
The actual discussion on Poland at Tehran occurred on 1 December. Stalin responded to 
requests to resume talks with the London Poles by stating categorically that he could not due to 
the fact that they had joined forces with the Nazi propaganda machine to slander the USSR and 
that Polish forces were involved in the killing of Soviet partisans in Poland. Stalin also stated 
that the least the Soviet Union would accept, in terms of territorial acquisition, was the Curzon 
Line, an eastern Polish frontier named after the post-World War One British Foreign Secretary 
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Curzon, put forward by the Allied Supreme Council after the First World War but before the 
Polish-Soviet war. They did agree to compensate the Polish state for the lost territory with East 
Prussia and other eastern German territory. The United Kingdom agreed to this decision and 
stated that if the Polish Government-in-Exile were to refuse, that they would be well and truly 
done with them and would defer to the Soviets at the peace table.16 This decision stripped Poland 
of 48 percent of its pre-war territory, and, in exchange, Poland would be given territory taken 
from eastern Germany, the so-called “recovered territories” based on the notion that they had 
historically belonged to Poland in the medieval period, before German encroachment to the 
east.17
In all of these deliberations the London Poles were kept uninvolved and in the dark by 
Stalin’s demand. The Polish Government-in-Exile’s response to the “official statements” of the 
Tehran conference came on 6 December 1943. In the response, the Polish Foreign Minister stated 
that Poland, as the longest struggling Allied nation, saw the cooperation of Teheran as heralding 
a speedy and complete end to the war. Moreover, the London Poles restated their belief in the 
Atlantic Charter to deliver to them a free and independent Poland in the post-war world.
 This plan, it was agreed, would be finalized at a later meeting.  
18
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 Stalin 
stated his view on the events of the conference on 15 December. He maintained his position that 
the London Poles were agents of Hitler and in league with the Nazis in an effort to defame the 
USSR. He stated that it was the policy of the Soviet Union to accept the Curzon line as the 
western Soviet border if the USSR was also given the Northern portions of East Prussia. In 
addition, as an amendment to the Curzon line, the Soviets would not return the city of Lwow, 
despite its majority Polish population, as it lay in an area dominated by Ukrainians. Stalin also 
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made public his support for a western Polish frontier on the Oder River.19 Churchill attempted to 
use the proposed Polish absorption of German territory to sell the Poles on the decisions reached 
at Yalta. With both Poland and the USSR set to receive German territory at the war’s end, 
Churchill argued to the government-in-exile that the two nations would be bound together by 
their joint duty to guard against a future German reemergence.20
Later, in February 1944 Churchill spoke about the Tehran conference in the House of 
Commons. In his speech, he stated that even though the United Kingdom had gone to war to 
protect Poland’s independence, Great Britain had never guarantied any specific Polish frontier, a 
reversal of Foreign Minister Eden’s statement of 30 July 1941. Furthermore, the British had 
never agreed to the Polish expansion after 1919, which had given them much of their eastern 
territory; it had instead upheld the Curzon Line. Churchill, mirroring Stalin’s own sentiments, 
claimed that Russia, having suffered two invasions from the West in the last fifty years, and after 
losing millions of men as a result, had the right to protect themselves by establishing more 
defensible western borders. Churchill did agree, like Stalin, to compensate the Poles for the loss 
of this territory by means of eastern portions of Germany.
 Churchill presented the option to 
the Poles by stating that they were being invited to be a protector of European peace. The Poles 
saw it differently, and correctly as it turned out, as being permanently bound to the USSR due to 
the threat of German revanchism.  
21
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20
 Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin, 288. 
21
 Raczyński and Biegański, Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, vol. II, 194. 
116 
 
 
Prime Minister, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, began to discuss the London Poles’ problems with the 
border issue, only to be told by a shocked Molotov that the issue had been settled at Tehran.22
 His territorial ambitions all but secured, Stalin next turned his attention to insuring that 
the Polish nation that remained after the war would be politically controlled by the Soviet state. 
Realizing that it would be the Red Army that would “liberate” Eastern Europe, Stalin knew that 
he would be able to get a lead on any attempt by the Western Allies to reestablish the pre-war 
governments of Eastern Europe by putting into power, in the “liberated areas”, communist 
governments, backed by the Red Army that answered to Moscow. On 24 June 1944, Stalin sent a 
letter to Roosevelt outlining his views on the restructuring of the Polish government. In it, he 
wrote of the importance of reorganizing the Polish government with elements of the London 
émigré leaders as well as Polish communists in the USSR and liberated Poland. As evidence of 
this need for change, he pointed out those statements by the London Poles on the issue of borders 
demonstrated that they had not made any forward movement on the issue of reconciliation with 
the Soviets. Thus Stalin, expressed his rational for a change of authority over the Polish state.
 
23
To this end the Soviets proclaimed on 21 July 1944, the establishment of the Polish 
Committee of National Liberation, also known as the Lublin Government.
  
24
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 This committee, 
formed from leftist and communist Poles acceptable to the USSR, was Stalin’s challenge to the 
authority of the London Poles. The Lublin Government claimed control over all the areas of 
Poland that the Red Army had “liberated”.  
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The London Poles responded to the formation of the Committee of National Liberation in 
a memorandum to Churchill on 24 July. The government-in-exile stated that the Committee was 
a communist government that was formed in areas of Poland which had never been contested by 
the Soviet Union. The Committee was established with the full knowledge of the USSR, and the 
use of Soviet radio in broadcasting the announcement proved Soviet backing for the Committee. 
Furthermore, the Committee was made up almost entirely of communists unknown to the vast 
majority of the Polish people. Nevertheless, the communists were organizing themselves as a 
government and claiming that the London Poles were an illegal fascist organization which made 
the Committee the sole legal source of authority in Poland.25 Despite this claim, the London 
Poles continued, the Committee offered no grounds as to why they should be considered 
Poland’s legitimate authority at the expense of the government-in-exile. The London Poles went 
on to express their worries that the Committee, not recognizing the government in London, 
would break up and/or betray the Polish underground, who had been struggling against the 
German invaders for five years. All of this was contrary, stated the London Poles, to promises 
made by Stalin throughout their negotiations on the future reestablishment of a government in 
Poland. It was evident that Stalin was putting into power a government that was answerable to 
him, not to the Polish people. The memorandum expressed that the Polish government fully 
expected the British to honor their promises to restore the Polish Government-in-Exile at the 
cessation of hostilities.26
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 Churchill sent a dispatch to Stalin on 27 July 1944, referencing the 
formation of the Committee of National Liberation. In the dispatch, Churchill pushed for the 
creation of a joint government of Poles residing in Great Britain and eastern Poles in the USSR; 
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this went against promises made to the London Poles, which stated that the government-in-exile 
would always be recognized as the legitimate Polish government. Churchill went on to say that it 
would be a pity and indeed a disaster if the West were to support one Polish government while 
the USSR supported another.27
It is clear that the Lublin Government was placed in power by Stalin in an effort to create 
a roadblock to the status quo antebellum which could not be undone. The Lublin Poles 
represented a government, recognized by the USSR, which the Polish people could “vote” for in 
the “free and democratic” elections that the USSR had promised in their adoption of the Atlantic 
Charter at the Inter-Allied Council in London on 24 September 1941. To this end, in Stalin’s 
response to Churchill’s letter on 28 July, he claimed that as Poland’s neighbor, the Soviet Union 
welcomed a Polish government friendly to the USSR. The National Committee, Stalin claimed, 
was friendlier towards the Soviet government and represented a good starting point for the 
formation of a new democratic government in Poland. The Committee, he continued, would lead 
to the unification of those London Poles who support democracy in Poland and would overcome 
the resistance of those anti-Soviet Poles who had caused the breakdown in relations between the 
two states. In conclusion, Stalin reiterated the importance of the Polish question to the Allied 
cause and stated that the Red Army was doing all it could to aid and accelerate the liberation of 
the Polish nation and assist them in regaining their freedom and prosperity.
   
28
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 What Stalin failed 
to mention is that were the Red Army went, the Red Army stayed. Once his forces had control 
over the Polish territory, he alone would decide what its future government would look like. 
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On 22 November, in reaction to talks with FDR, during which he declared that he would 
not guarantee any specific Polish borders, specifically in regards to Wilno and Lwow, the 
government-in-exile refused to ratify any agreement with the Soviets that did not adhere to the 
pre-war borders, as agreed upon in numerous past agreements and declarations with the Western 
Allies.29  With the London Poles refusing to accept Stalin’s deal, President Mikolajczyk saw little 
hope for bettering the Polish position and resigned.  After another Socialist minister’s attempt 
was foiled by members of the right wing National Democrats, socialist politician Tomasz 
Arciszewski managed to form a government, and subsequently became the last war-time PM of 
the Polish Government-in-Exile.30
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 This inner turmoil gave the appearance to the outside world 
that the London Poles were not interested in any deal with the Soviets, only in squabbling with 
themselves and holding up the workings of inner-Allied unity.  Arciszewski’s new government 
was far more firm in defense of Polish rights than Sikorski’s or Mikolajczyks had been. Having 
been backed into a corner, the new Prime minster decided that the Poles could not give anymore. 
Arciszewski was determined to defend Poland’s territorial and political sovereignty to the last. 
Though this garnered Arciszewski the support of Poles living in the West, as well as the Polish 
Army, the Western governments were not pleased, believing that they could not force this new 
government compromise with the Soviets. The British were angered and outraged by this turn of 
events, with Eden going so far as to recommend pulling their ambassador to the London Poles. 
Churchill claimed that the new Polish government was inherently weak and that Mikolajczyk 
would be back in powered soon. Until then, he assured Stalin that the British attitude toward the 
new government would be correct but very cold. For the USSR Arciszewski‘s government was 
30
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very convenient. Due to its stubbornness, Stalin could more readily blame the Poles for the lack 
of compromise, and the West would more readily believe him.31
Stalin took this opportunity to urge the Allies to recognize his Lublin government as 
legitimate, sighting the perceived stubbornness and intractability of the London Poles. The 
Western powers asked Stalin to delay in any action concerning a transfer of legitimacy until the 
Big Three had met early the next year at Yalta.
 From this point on, the West, for 
all intents and purposes, ignored the new Polish government. The Soviets were now free to make 
additional unilateral decisions on Poland. 
32
The conference at Tehran was the beginning of the end for the Second Republic. By the 
time the Big Three met, it was clear to all that the Polish issue had diminished to secondary 
status. Victory in the war was to take precedence over all other considerations, and if the West 
had to sacrifice to Poland achieve the final victory, then so be it. Yet, perhaps the most 
frightening aspect of the conference was the fact that the Western leaders apparently believed 
that Stalin would honor all the promises he had made to achieve his goals. The Poles’ warnings 
about Stalin and his promises fell on deaf ears.  
 There is little doubt that by this time, the Poles 
were seen as an inconvenient ally for the West to have. The London Poles’ refusal to negotiate 
away half of their nation and the subsequent fall of Mikolajczyk’s government caused many in 
the Allied camp to wash their hands of the Polish problem and turn to other matters they saw as 
more important, effectively handing the initiative of the settlement of post-war Poland, and 
indeed eastern Europe, to Stalin.  
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Chapter VII 
The Shape of Things to Come  
Yalta: 1945 
 
By the time the Three Great Powers met once again at the Yalta Conference in February 
1945, the Red Army was in control of the territory of the Polish nation, and Stalin’s puppets, the 
Lublin Government, in charge of its administration. Indeed, the USSR was already in the process 
of re-annexing the eastern sections of Poland that it had first taken in 1939.  Yalta once again 
saw the Polish question sidelined as issues more important to leaders took precedence. The 
conference was a world-shaking event, not just for Poland, but for the entire continent. Yalta has 
been described as an American revolt against the European order which had dominated world 
politics for centuries.1 It transformed the obvious United Kingdom –Soviet Union post-war 
confrontation into the worldwide Cold War we are familiar with today. Churchill was the 
spokesman of the old order.  What he suggested was the classical European pragmatic solution: 
the restoration of France and Poland as powerful nations in order to arrange a balance of power 
such as that created by the Congress of Vienna in1815.2 He also sought to limit reparations that 
would be paid by Germany at the conclusion of hostilities, as to prevent another treaty of 
Versailles, and therefore cease the vicious cycle that had begun with the Franco-Prussian War of 
1870-71.3
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 Yet Churchill was only able to achieve the restoration of France, dooming any idea of 
a balance of power, insuring Western Europe would become dependent both economically and 
militarily on American support in the new Cold War. With the new power dynamic in place, 
Churchill continually sought a showdown with the Soviets in order to create a better post-war 
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settlement. To facilitate this, he kept focusing on the unresolved Polish situation; he was ignored 
by the US and the USSR, who were determined to avoid a crisis at any cost.4
Stalin, for his part, did nothing to prevent the change in the order of the world. He was 
primarily determined to keep the Polish territory that he had gained in 1939 while allied with 
Hitler, and maintain the political control over Eastern Europe given to him by the Red Army’s 
conquests.
 
5 Whatever he had to agree to get it was inconsequential; he could change his mind 
after the fact. Stalin achieved his goals by a process of out-maneuvering Churchill and his aims 
while manipulating FDR on his own objectives. He was able to push the issue of Poland, 
knowing that the West was willing to let it go due to the Cambridge Five spy ring, operating in 
the British government and giving Stalin an immense intelligence advantage, showing 
definitively that the Allies were not willing to stand for Poland.6
FDR was the main architect for the shape of the new world, due primarily to his failures 
rather than his successes. His decisions must not be viewed in the light of the Cold War he 
helped to create but rather in the light of 1930s American isolationism. FDR’s main goal was to 
get the USSR to support the formation of the United Nations and to intervene in the war against 
Japan.
 Most importantly of all, he had 
the Red Army, perhaps the strongest bargaining chip in the world at that time. As long as Stalin 
possessed the Red Army, he would get what he desired. It soon became clear to both sides that 
whoever controlled a territory would decide its social, economic, and political system.  
7
                                                 
4
 Harbutt, Yalta 1945, 304. 
 FDR saw a Europe divided between the United Kingdom and USSR’s spheres of 
influence as a normal development. After all, it seemed at the time that Stalin and Churchill were 
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to be the only two European leaders left standing after the war, though in reality Churchill lost 
his position at the end of July 1945. In truth, Stalin and Churchill did not care about FDR’s UN; 
they cared about future security, and merely agreed to the venture in order to get American 
support. Stalin, in particular, used discussions on the UN as a negotiating tool.8
Stalin also knew that the West was anxious to secure Soviet involvement in the war 
against Japan and were willing to pay the price for the Red Army’s participation in the Pacific 
Theater.
  
9 After FDR had gotten what he desired from the Soviets, he seems to have lost interest 
in the post-war blueprint of Europe. He merely contented himself with garnering promises from 
Stalin about free elections in Eastern Europe.10 Having consoled himself with thinking that Stalin 
would honor his promises of elections, he informed the American public of his new vision for a 
free democratic Europe. Unfortunately, his naivety in believing Stalin satisfied the public and 
turned them away from foreign affairs, which allowed the Soviets a free hand in setting up 
puppet governments in the east. Due to FDR’s wishful thinking, and the failure of his own plan 
for a European balance of power, Churchill began to push for an Anglo-American front against 
the Soviets, as the United States was the only nation powerful enough after the war to assume 
leadership and defend the Western Bloc of nations. By doing this, it was insured that the US had 
a stake in the future of Europe.11
When the Polish issue was discussed at the conference, Stalin opened by stating that the 
question of Poland was one of honor and security for the Soviet state. Poland, he argued, had 
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been a corridor for the invasion of Russia far too many times.12 This necessitated a strong and 
independent Poland that could defend itself from future aggression. With the Soviets 
approaching Berlin, any strong stance against the Soviets was hampered by Roosevelt’s 
insistence on seeing Stalin not as the invader of Poland in 1939, but as Uncle Joe, his fraternal 
ally. He summarized his rationale for his wartime relations with Stalin in 1943 when confronted 
by US ambassador to the USSR William Bullitt, Jr., who stated that Stalin was a “devil like 
tyrant leading a vile system”.13 Roosevelt responded to Bullitt Jr., “I just have a hunch that Stalin 
is not that kind of a man. ... and I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask for 
nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work with 
me for a world of democracy and peace”14
The Western Allies acquiesce to the Soviet premier’s wishes. The Soviets, single 
handedly carrying the war on the Easter Front, were more important that the Poles and their half 
a million fighting me. It was far easier for the West to force the government-in-exile to 
compromise than it was to prevail over Stalin’s desires. At Yalta, the Allies therefore ceded to 
Stalin the areas of Poland promised to him in his pact with Hitler, legitimizing the pact between 
the two dictators that had begun the worldwide conflict. The process to facilitate this recognition 
began on 7 February 1945, when Molotov put forward the following proposals in regard to the 
Polish question. First, it was the position of the Soviet Union that the Curzon Line should be the 
final frontier for eastern Poland, with a western border on the Oder and Neisse rivers. Secondly, 
the Provisional Government of Poland would invite selected democratic, anti-Nazi, (originally 
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stated as non-fascist) Western émigrés to join with them in a unity government. This 
organization would then be recognized by the UN as the legitimate government of Poland until 
the Polish people could be called to the polls for general voting on a permanent government.15 
Stalin claimed that the elections would be held about one month after the Germans defeat. In 
reality it would be almost two years.16
On 11 February, the final decisions on post-war Poland were reached at Yalta, almost 
completely in step with the Soviet position. They stated that the Allied powers were still 
committed to a free, independent, and democratic Poland. Due to the fact that the Red Army, not 
the Western Allies had liberated Poland, it needed a government that was more accessible and 
broadly based on the will of the Polish people. In light of this, the Committee of National 
Liberation would invite certain democratic leaders from the London Poles and form a 
Provisional Government of Poland. This would then be recognized by the UN and the Great 
Powers as the legitimate government of the Polish state. The Provisional government would help 
to finalize the decision on German cessions of territory to form Poland’s western border at the 
future post-war peace conference.
  
17 As for the final border of the post-war Polish state, the 
Curzon Line was definitively and officially stated to be the eastern frontier of Poland. 
Throughout the entire conference Stalin had treated Poland’s eastern border as a fait accompli.18
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He was sure that the West would give him the territory he desired, and therefore directed the 
majority of the conversation to discussions on Poland’s western border. The only “serious” 
challenge to Stalin’s territorial acquisitions was when FDR pressed Stalin for a gesture, to help 
16
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the London Poles save face. FDR requested that the USSR seed Lwow, a city with a Polish 
majority east of the Curzon Line, to the Poles. Stalin curtly refused stating that it was the British 
who had drawn the Curzon line, not the USSR, and they had left Lwow in Soviet hands. 19
In return for the acceptance of the Soviet position, Stalin promised Churchill free 
elections not only in Poland but in all of Eastern Europe in accordance with the Atlantic Charter. 
In reality the agreement at Yalta included no mechanism for enforcing this promise of free 
elections. Molotov managed to remove the language calling for supervised elections from the 
documents.
 He 
failed to mention that at the time of the Curzon Lines creation neither the Poles nor the Soviets 
recognized it legitimacy. 
20
The London Poles protested the outcome of the Yalta conference vehemently, as shown 
in a conversation between the Count Raczynski and Eden on 20 February 1945. In his protest, 
Raczynski pointed out that the decisions made at Yalta were taken without Poland’s knowledge 
or agreement, an offense so unprecedented that had not even been done to liberated Axis satellite 
states such as Romania and Hungary. Yet the offense was not unprecedented, as illustrated by 
the Munich Conference of 1938, indeed it had become the custom for the Great Powers to 
unilaterally decided the fate of “lesser” nations.  Raczynski continued saying that the decision 
 This meant that the Western Allies trusted the Soviets to honor their promises 
without any verification, which gave the USSR a free hand in determining the future government 
of the Polish state. In effect, this led to a de-facto recognition of the Lublin Government by the 
West, due to the weakness of the agreement’s language, and allowed the Soviets to stretch their 
promises to fit any need that might arise.  
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was contrary to the declaration made by Churchill on 5 August 1940, and also to several 
documented statements by Mr. Eden himself that there would be no territorial changes to Poland 
without the agreement of all interested parties. In addition, the result of the Yalta conference was 
contrary to statements by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin on their desire for a sovereign and 
independent Poland. Raczynski stated definitively that if governance of the Polish nation was left 
to the Lublin government, it meant that it would, in fact, be governed by the NKVD. Eden 
responded by stating that the decisions arrived at in Yalta were unavoidable in light of the Allies’ 
overall plan for post-war Europe. In addition, he denied Raczynski’s accusations that Yalta was a 
Soviet success, claiming that Stalin had originally pushed for total recognition of the Lublin 
government, not a unity party. When pressed on the final composition of the post-war 
provisional government, Eden stated that no date had been set for elections.21
On this point, Stalin was adamant in refusing to admit foreign observers to Poland for any 
election or plebiscite that might be held in the future. On 7 April 1945 in a letter to Churchill, he 
masked this in an attack on England’s dealings with the new Polish Provisional Government. He 
claimed that the provisional government wanted no foreign observers on its soil. Stalin continued 
that this was not surprising given the unfriendly attitude the West had adopted toward them in 
questioning their (mostly Soviet backed communist) composition. In addition, he stated that the 
British government’s attempts to force the provisional government to accept Mr. Mikolajczyk 
(the recognized Polish Prime Minister) into the organization when the Prime Minister had 
attacked the decisions of Yalta and the provisional government’s forerunner, the Lublin 
government, had angered the Committees leaders. Stalin then pointed out that the provisional 
government had allowed foreign observers and other parties into their nation from other 
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friendlier countries such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Stalin neglected to point out that 
these were both nations with Soviet imposed communist governments.22 This lack of effort on 
the part of the Allies is often seen as Western acceptance of Eastern Europe falling firmly under 
the Soviet sphere of control. Yalta is seen as truly ushering in the era of Soviet dominance that 
would last fifty years.23 Through all of this, the London Poles were again excluded from the talks 
at Stalin’s insistence, and their objections were brushed aside for political expediency. As a final 
blow to their position, the government-in-exile was told by the Allies to join the Lublin 
Government in the Party of National Unity, that is, to abandon what they saw as their legitimate 
yet unraveling claim as the true government of Poland. Seeing the writing on the wall and hoping 
that they would have at least some chance to influence affairs of state, a few of the London Poles 
including former Prime Minister Mikołajczyk eventually decided to take up the Soviet offer. 
Though publicly and in theory it was stated that they were equal partners in practice, the London 
Poles that went east were outnumbered in the party by Soviet backed leftist and were quickly 
rendered irrelevant.24
Yalta proved that by 1945 the Polish issue had become nothing more than a bargaining 
chip on the map of post-war Europe. With the war coming to a close, the shape of things to come 
was the question on the mind of the Big Three. Each leader had his own agenda; FDR had the 
UN, and Churchill had his Anglo-American front against the USSR. Only Stalin was concerned 
with the Polish question, i.e. assuring his control over the broken nation. Remarkably, after all 
that had happened - after Katyn and the stranding of the Warsaw Uprising - the West still 
believed that Stalin would keep his word regarding free elections in the Soviet sphere. Whether it 
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was born out of ignorance, naivety, or indifference, Yalta effectively doomed Eastern Europe to 
a further five decades of occupation with the hammer and sickle replacing the swastika.  
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CHAPTER VIII  
The Price of Victory  
Potsdam and Beyond: 1945-1947 
 
With the European war’s end in May 1945, the Polish Government-in-Exile’s world was 
collapsing around them. Though the Western Allies entered into the Second World War, 
supposedly, to defend Polish national sovereignty, the pre-war Polish government had been 
sidelined and replaced by the Western Allies, quick to please Stalin. The West had traded Poland 
to Stalin for the promise of stability, just as they had Czechoslovakia to Hitler, the only 
difference being the six million Polish dead, including 600,000 that fell fighting for the Allied 
cause.1
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 In a note from Count Raczynski to Eden on 6 July 1945, the London Poles protested the 
violation of the rights of Polish nation by the recognition of the Provisional Government of 
National Unity by the Three Great Powers. This, coupled with the withdrawal of recognition of 
London Poles, represented an unprecedented abandonment of one of Britain’s allies. In response 
to a call by the British government to transfer his position to a member of the Polish provisional 
government, Raczynski stated he had been made the ambassador by order of the constitutional 
government of the Polish Second Republic, and he would not surrender that authority. Raczynski 
put forward the fact that the government-in-exile had signed agreements with the United 
Kingdom, France, and the United States, as well as numerous multilateral agreements such as the 
Atlantic Charter, which prove that they were the legitimate government of the Polish nation. He 
went on to state that for the past six years, the Polish Armed Forces had been sacrificing 
themselves for the Allied cause under the authority of the London Poles, but at the war’s 
victorious conclusion, Poland remained under foreign occupation. Raczynski reminded Eden that 
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the Second World War was started to preserve the sovereignty of Poland, and now, even though 
Poland found itself on the winning side, the Polish people, were still deprived of their freedom 
and independence and were still under the control of hostile alien power. The Lublin 
Government had been forced upon Poland and did not represent the will of the Polish people. 
Once more in its history, Poland found itself deprived of its independence, but its people, he 
stated, resolved to never give up the struggle for liberation. Because of this, Raczynski once 
again refused to delegate his authority to the provisional government unless he was ordered to by 
the constitutional leaders of the Polish nation: i.e. the government-in-exile.2
Ignoring the stance of the London Poles, the Three Great Powers met at the Potsdam 
Conference in July 1945. Potsdam once again showed how truly unimportant the Polish question 
had become as the war had run its course in Europe and was then in its final months in the 
Pacific. The world had changed so completely as a result of the war as to make the matter of 
Poland a dead issue. The Soviet Union was occupying Central and Eastern Europe with the Red 
Army encamped on the border of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany. Refugees were fleeing 
out of Eastern Europe fearing the imminent, and in some places well implemented, Stalinist take-
over. The United Kingdom had a new Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, who lacked Churchill’s 
vehement ant-communist furor, and was far more interested in rebuilding his country and 
standing up to future Soviet threats than with the all but settled politics of Eastern Europe.
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 The 
United States had a new President, Harry Truman, who was also unlike his predecessor. In this 
case it was his distrust of the Soviets which set him apart. With the war ending and the Germans 
defeated, the usefulness of inter-Allied unity, in regards to the USSR was fading, and the 
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American government was becoming much more suspicious of communists than it had been the 
past decade under FDR.4 Post-war Germany and East-West cooperation was the main thrust of 
the conference. Truman and his advisers saw the Soviets’ actions in Eastern Europe as 
aggressive expansionism which was a violation of the agreements Stalin had committed to at 
Yalta in February. Stalin insisted that his control of Eastern Europe was a defensive measure 
against possible future attacks (by whom he declined to say). Furthermore, he expressed that 
Eastern Europe was a legitimate sphere of Soviet influence.5
In regards to Poland, its fate was a foregone conclusion, its freedom signed away by FDR 
at Yalta to gain Soviet acceptance of the UN and support against the Japanese, support that came 
when Japan was all but defeated by the power of the American’s Atom Bomb.
  
6
On 8 July 1945 the Western Leaders completed their abandonment of the London Poles 
which had begun at Tehran. The Soviet Union flushed with victory on the issue proposed three 
 Despite the death 
of FDR, with the loss of Churchill, no major leader was willing to use force to defend the 
sovereignty of the Polish nation as they had sworn to do in 1939. The most devastating war in 
human history had just ended and nobody wished to initiate another one. Even with the power of 
the atomic bomb, Truman was unwilling to fight the Soviets for control of Eastern Europe. Six 
years of war had been enough for the West, and the Pacific conflict was still raging. Truman 
became more concerned with halting further Soviet expansion than with overturning that which 
had already taken place. Additionally, he was consumed with assuming leadership of the 
Western European bloc that had begun to form in opposition to the USSR after Yalta.  
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points on issues regarding diplomatic relations with new Polish government and the surrender of 
government property held by London Poles. First, the Soviets stated that in view of the 
establishment and recognition of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, the Three 
Great Powers should immediately sever all relations with the London Poles. Next, the 
government-in-exile should transfer all official assets to the new government and the Allies 
should forbid the transfer of governmental property and assets to any private person. Not only 
would this grant the provisional government the various Polish symbols of office, but would also 
grant them access to the finances of the government-in-exile, increasing their claims to 
legitimacy while eviscerating the London Poles claim. Finally, the Polish Army, Navy, and Air 
Force should immediately subordinate themselves to the authority of the new Polish government 
that would then determine any further measures to be taken on the issue (i.e. the return of Polish 
servicemen).7
On 2 August, the concluding communiqué of the Potsdam Conference was issued 
containing final resolutions on Polish affairs. The communiqué reads that the decisions made at 
Potsdam were joint decisions between the Three Great Powers and served to confirm the 
decisions made at the Yalta conference in February 1945. The powers agreed to the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity 
and the severing of relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile. In addition, the United 
Kingdom and the United States would insure measures were taken to protect the interests of 
provisional government and would work to obtain property of the Polish state and insure that is 
had not been relocated into private hands, pending transfer to the Provisional government. The 
communiqué went on to say that the Allies wished to facilitate the return of all Poles abroad that 
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desired return to their nation, including servicemen from the Polish Armed Forces and Merchant 
Marine. Those who chose to return, it was expected, would be given personal and property rights 
on the same basis as all Polish citizens. Finally, the Provisional Government agreed to future, 
free, unfettered elections with universal suffrage and a secret ballot. All democratic, anti-Nazi 
parties would have the right to take part in such an election and to put forward candidates for 
office. The Allied press would also be allowed into the country to report on the process before 
and during the elections, a promise that was later denied.8
The meeting of the Three Great Powers at Potsdam was the final nail in the coffin of the 
Polish Second Republic. The portion of the conference on Poland was merely a further 
ratification of what had been agreed upon at Yalta. The Three Great Powers, once again without 
the presence of the government-in-exile, conclusively established and recognized a Polish 
provisional government to be formed in Poland by the Party of National Unity, dominated by the 
Lublin Poles, pending future elections. In addition, the meeting finalized the territorial reshaping 
of Eastern Europe with the final western boarders of post-war Poland agreed upon, situated on 
the Oder-Neisse line.
  
9
Potsdam and the western border issue can be described as the first instance of Polish-
Soviet unity during the war,
   
10
                                                 
8
 Raczyński and Biegański, Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, vol. II, 634. 
 though they approached the issue with different motivations. For 
the Poles, with the loss of their eastern territory there was a need to make up for it in the West, in 
the areas of the medieval Polish Kingdom. For the Soviets, it was an effort to lengthen their 
reach further into Western Europe. Additionally, by having the Poles take as much German 
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territory as possible, Stalin would ensure that the Poles were forced to ally with the USSR. Who 
else could be counted upon to defend the Poles’ new territory in the face of a resurgent German 
threat?11
Regardless, the Potsdam decision was the final, unequivocal abandonment of the London 
Poles by the Western Allies, which would doom Poland to a half century of Soviet oppression.  
In effect, the territory of the Polish nation had rolled half of its total area to the west. In doing so, 
they lost much of their ancestral heartland from which the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
had drawn much of its wealth and power.  
 Therefore Stalin pushed for Poland’s border to be as far west as possible, against the 
reticence of the Western Allies. In doing so he attempted to show that the Soviets were the Poles 
true allies while the West was oriented towards the Germans. The Soviets made ample use of the 
West’s near-constant retreat from their promises to the Poles, to capitalize on the Poles’ sense of 
resentment and abandonment. The Soviets used the idea of the “Western Betrayal” to prove that 
Polish nation could not trust the West in the future and instead should ally with the nation that 
“liberated” their country from the German invaders.  
The creation of the various Polish combat units was done with the notion that if the Allies 
saw that the Poles were taking an active role in the fighting of the war, they would treat Poland 
as a full member of the Allied camp. By war’s end, the Polish Armed Forces represented the 
fourth largest Allied contingent in the European war.12
                                                 
11
  Edward J. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), 405. 
 On every front - land, air, and sea - 
wherever the Allies were fighting the Germans, the Poles were there actively participating, many 
times playing crucial roles. Yet, all the Poles fighting and dying for the Allied cause did nothing 
to save their country as it was sold to the Soviets for vague guaranties. Despite the sacrifices 
12
 Kenneth K. Koskodan, No Greater Ally: The Untold Story of Poland's Forces in World War II. (Oxford, UK: 
Osprey Pub., 2009), 7-9. 
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made by the Polish fighting men, when the Three Great Powers met to discuss the future of post-
war Europe, they did so without the presence of the Polish Government-in-Exile, and forgetting 
the thousands of Poles on the war’s front lines.  
Indeed, almost as an afterthought, the conference considered the fate of the Polish 
soldiers who had been fighting in the West since 1940. The Three Great Powers decided to allow 
the Poles in the West to return home to Poland and resettle. The issue was discussed on 13 July 
1945 by General Anders and Field Marshal Alexander. In the conversation, Anders begged 
Alexander to not force any Pole who wished to stay in the West to return to Poland. Alexander 
responded favorably, yet he stated that something like that was a question for Allied Forces 
Supreme Headquarters. Anders went on to request that, due to statements of Soviet propaganda, 
the refugee camps for the now demobilized Polish servicemen should be British run so that the 
USSR could not say that Anders had forced any of his 110,000 men to remain in the West.13
                                                 
13
 Raczyński and Biegański, Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, vol. II, 630. 
 As it 
happened, the option to return to Poland was rejected by the vast majority of the Polish 
servicemen as many of their homes had been in the eastern territories annexed by the USSR. 
Additionally, it was feared that the Soviets would attack the returning soldiers as infected with 
Western ideas and therefore dangerous to the USSR’s hold on the nation.  
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Map 5. “The Oder-Neisse Line”  
Carr, Adam. http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/  commons/9/92/Oder-neisse.gif,(accessed April 1, 2013) 
 
With the Oder-Neisse line decided upon as the Western border of Poland, the large 
numbers of Germans in the new Polish territories would have to be removed. The communist-
backed Government of National Unity, as well as the Soviet authorities wanted them removed in 
order to facilitate a more homogenous Polish nation state mirroring the National Democrat’s 
position at the creation of the Second Republic.14
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 Norman Davies, God's Playground, a History of Poland: In Two Volumes: Volume II, 1795 to the Present. 
(Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 2005), 367-368. 
 This continuity was latched onto by the 
Government of National Unity in an attempt to legitimize themselves in the eyes of the Polish 
people. By claiming they were carrying out the same mission as some of the Second Republics 
founding figures and its government in the early 1920s, they laid claim to being the legitimate 
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successors to the Polish nation, as opposed to the London Poles who they painted as being the 
successors to the “fascist” Sanjaca regime.  
Over the next six years from 1944 to 1945, over seven million Germans were forcibly 
removed from what the new Polish government called, the “recovered territories,” based on the 
notion that they had historically belonged to Poland in the medieval period, before German 
encroachment to the east.15
This was accomplished by both legal, i.e. government sponsored, and non-legal, i.e. 
popular violence and mob justice, methods.
  
16 The Germans were not the only victims of a forced 
exodus. During the same time period, from 1944 to 1946, millions of Poles were forced from 
their homes in the eastern portions of pre-war Poland, now under the control of the USSR and 
split between the Soviet Republics of Belorussia, Ukraine, and Lithuania.17 Even more troubling, 
almost half of the Polish populations in these territories were not allowed to leave; rather they 
were forced to retain the Soviet citizenship which had been foisted on them during the Soviet 
occupation of 1939-1941.18
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 Steffen Prauser and Arfon Rees, “The Expulsion of 'German' Communities from Eastern Europe at the end of the 
Second World War,” (European University Institute, Florence. HEC No. 2004/1.): 22, accessed April 1, 
2013, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/2599/HEC04-
01.pdf;jsessionid=B39D3A552E3B75F8B45FA5E1EDAD1CE1?sequence=1 
 Indeed many of the Poles residing in these regions had been drafted 
into the Red Army during the course of the war. Perhaps most heartbreaking of all, because they 
had been captured by the Soviets during the September campaign and subsequently released after 
the signing of the 30 July 1941 Sikorski-Mayski Agreement the majority of the soldiers in the 
Polish Armed Forces in the West had come from the eastern areas of Poland. This made the 
Polish Provisional Government’s demands that they be forcibly repatriated all the more insulting 
16
 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2012),320-323. 
17
 Halik Kochanski,The Eagle Unbowed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 545. 
18
 Edward Raczyński and Stanisław Biegański. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations. 1939-1945. [Edited by Count 
Edward Raczyńcki and Stanislaw Biegański.]. Vol. II. (London: Heinemann, 1961), 227. 
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as the men in many cases had no home to return to. Indeed, some 30 officers in the Polish II 
Corps committed suicide upon learning that their homes had been given to the Soviets.19
Poland was the nation that lost more of its population and territory than any other state, 
while supposedly on the victorious side. Additionally, they had suffered six years of German 
occupation and were facing fifty years of Soviet domination. Despite this, they were not to be 
given any reparations of their own by the Germans. It was agreed at Potsdam that they would be 
given only 15% of the Soviet Union’s reparations at Stalin’s insistence.
 
20
Aside from the death sentence the Second Republic received at the conference, an even 
deeper insult to the Poles also arose from Potsdam. In the agreement, the decision was made on 
how the Allies were to try the Germans for war crimes. The Germans were to be judged for the 
crimes against humanity at a special tribunal and their evil exposed to the world. Yet, sitting in 
judgment alongside the Western Allies would be delegates from the USSR, the perpetrators of 
innumerable crimes and savageries against the Polish people. As if to add even further insult, the 
Soviets then tried to place the blame for the worst of their crimes, Katyn, on the shoulders of the 
Germans, as they had been attempting to do since the Germans had first discovered the killing 
grounds.
 This pitiful amount can 
be seen as an effort by Stalin to keep the Poles reliant of the USSR and control what aid Poland 
received. 
21
Throughout this entire process, the remaining London Poles tried desperately to reason 
with the Western leaders. To this end, they issued a statement on 14 August 1945, protesting the 
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Potsdam conference on the principles of freedom and equality among the nations of the world. 
The statement proclaimed that the secret diplomacy at Potsdam could not be considered a 
democratic method of conducting international affairs. The Three Great Powers passed 
resolutions affecting other states and arrogated to themselves the exclusive right of organizing 
post-war Europe along lines fixed by themselves and themselves alone. The arbitrary method 
with which they went about this was particularly striking with regards to Poland. It continued by 
saying that the statement from the final communiqué that, “those who chose to return, it was 
expected, would be given personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens,” 
in light of the arrests and deportations of those Poles the Soviets saw as dangerous to their rule, 
was blatantly false. Furthermore, the newly recognized government was nothing but the Lublin 
government with the addition of two London Poles who were relegated to the sidelines and held 
no actual power; it was not, as stated, an expression of national unity. It was in fact a Polish 
Communist Party who received its orders from Moscow, headed by Boleslaw Bierut, a Soviet 
citizen and noted Comintern member. In addition, the decisions of the Potsdam conference did 
not contain a guarantee of elections, merely a statement that the elections would be held at some 
unspecified time at some unspecified place. The statement then reminded the Allies that the 
government-in-exile had put forth a plan which stated that the election should be held under 
Western supervision after Soviet troops and authorities had left Poland. This plan was rejected 
due to pressure from Stalin. In regards to Poland the Potsdam conference amounted to an 
inclusion of Poland (the war’s most victimized nation) in the USSR reparations and left the 
Polish people at the mercy of the Soviets. All border issues, they said, had fallen in the Soviet’s 
favor: the acceptance of the Curzon line, the loss of Lwow, and the Soviet annexation of 
Koenigsberg. Finally, the decision had not contained any mention of the release of the sixteen 
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Polish leaders being held by USSR. These men had headed the Polish underground through six 
years of war and had suffered and fought for the Allied cause along with many others imprisoned 
by the Soviets. These heroes had been abandoned by the West out of political expediency. The 
position of the Polish Government-in-Exile was that there could be no lasting peace in the world 
unless it was based on equality, freedom, justice, and the rule of international law. The legitimate 
Polish government would continue to do everything in its power to achieve the triumph of these 
principles.22
In the end, Churchill tried to argue that the Polish tragedy was the fault of the 
government-in-exile, insisting that had the Poles given into Soviets territorial demands early on 
they would have been able to salvaged political control of whatever Polish nation was left.
 As usual, their last cries were ignored as the issues, it was explained, had already 
been settled.  
23
The elections long promised by Stalin never materialized, only a fixed referendum in 
1946. Even so, the original returns from the polls showed that less than 20 percent of the 
 
Churchill’s argument disregards one crucial factor, that expansion of Soviet power was the 
primary goal of the USSR. The post-war fate of Czechoslovakia proves this point. While the 
Soviets argued that Poland needed to be within the Soviet sphere for many reasons, such as its 
use as an avenue of invasion into the USSR, its non-Polish minorities, and its historic negative 
attitude towards the Russians, none of these rationales applied to the Czechs. Indeed the 
democratically-elected Czech President Benes had tried long and hard to establish friendly 
relations with the USSR. Yet despite this, when the Soviets had the chance, they conquered 
Czechoslovakia, just as they did the rest of Eastern Europe.  
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populace voted in favor of the communists. In typical Stalinist fashion, this was changed to show 
overwhelming support for the Soviet backed government.24
With Stalin now assured the West would not interfere, the process of nationalizing 
Poland’s economy began, and the start of land reform was implemented. Additionally, Soviet 
authorities started the transfer of Poland to a single party Soviet state. All right wing parties were 
outlawed, leaving no choice in future elections except for the state-sponsored party. Opposition 
leaders were rounded up and executed after show trials or exiled far to the east. Resistance was 
brutally put down, and members of the Home Army, still fighting the same fight they began in 
1939, were routed out and destroyed.
  Despite the obvious foul play 
involved in the referendum, it was recognized by the West out of political expediency. The 
Western Allies agreed that Poland was not worth fighting a second, potentially more destructive 
war over. The time for resisting Stalin’s territorial demands was over. It would have taken a 
strong show of force by the Western Allies at the time when Stalin was at his weakest for a 
favorable outcome to the Polish question to be wrested from him. Yet throughout the war, Stalin 
knew that the West would not attempt such action, due to the value they placed on the Red 
Army. 
25 Foreign states began to recognize the new communist 
government as the legitimate government of Poland, and the government-in-exile was evicted 
from the Polish consulate in London.26
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 Davies, God's Playground, 424. 
 The same process was repeating itself all over Eastern 
Europe as the Iron Curtin began to descend across the continent. The Allies’ indifference to the 
Soviets actions in Eastern Europe sealed its fate for the next half century. Had Truman reacted to 
Stalin’s violations of Yalta in the east, as he did later in the case of Communist incursions into 
25
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26
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Turkey and Greece, the Soviets may have had no choice but to honor their promise of free 
elections rather than risk a confrontation with the West. 27
With the European conflict at an end, the conference at Potsdam showed that the issue of 
Poland was dead-on-arrival. The decision as to Poland’s future had been hammered out at Yalta 
months before; Potsdam merely made the deal official. Despite the change in leadership from the 
open FDR to the suspicious anticommunist Truman, the concern was with the looming Cold 
War, not in trying to wrest Poland back to the western side of the Iron Curtin. Within months, 
Stalin’s promises were shown to be worthless in rigged elections, NKVD arrests, and show trials 
all over Europe. For Poland, the occupation continued with great forced migrations of peoples 
and the territory of the Polish nation itself to the West. The Polish soldiers, sailors, and airmen in 
the West had, it seemed, been fighting and sacrifice for their Allies’ freedom, not theirs, as they 
were left nationless and forgotten. The government-in-exile, a hollow shell of what it had been 
even in 1940, pledged to remain and keep the torch burning, but already the governments of the 
world were recognizing the council from Lublin as the legitimate voice of the Polish people.  
 Instead Stalin violated his promises 
from the Atlantic Charter, Yalta, and Potsdam, while the West, seeing Poland as a lost cause, 
moved on to the next battlefield of the Cold War.   
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Conclusion  
 
 
As this thesis has demonstrated, the Second Polish Republic was in many ways doomed 
from the start. Reestablished in November 1918, after 123 years of foreign domination, it lay 
isolated in Eastern Europe between its two large and powerful traditional foes. The hostility of 
Germany and the USSR, coupled with the precariousness of the Poles’ newly-won independence, 
left few options for the Poles’ survival. The Second Republic therefore spent its twenty-year 
existence searching for a place on the European stage while seeking legitimacy as a Great Power 
both at home and abroad.  
From the beginning, there were arguments about the borders of a Polish state and how it 
should fit into the framework of Europe. Pilsudski’s Intermarium federation vied with 
Dmowski’s Polish nation state, but due to wars, treaties, and infighting, the Second Republic fell 
in between the two concepts, and in the process, failed to accomplish either. The unstable politics 
of the Second Republic were a byproduct of the attempt to form a functioning state from the 
remnants of three empires after more than a century of foreign domination, magnified by the 
treacherousness of the Poles’ position in Europe. The Polish Sejm’s inability to reconcile these 
problems, combined with insufficient time to establish a culture of democracy within Poland, 
resulted in the nation turning to authoritarianism to ensure its economic and diplomatic security. 
Pilsudski’s coup in May 1926, and the subsequent Sanacja government did much to strengthen 
the inner workings of the Polish nation, but at the cost of foreign disapproval, harming the 
standing of not only the Polish government but also the Polish state. The Marshal’s death in 1935 
and the loss of his guiding hand left Poland’s government adrift, causing it to shift further 
towards open authoritarianism. The Second Republic’s foreign policy mirrored their internal 
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struggles. Based on a misguided view of their own strength and importance to their allies, 
Pilsudski and subsequently Beck’s policy of equilibrium could not stand without secure 
guaranties from the Western powers that were content to give in to Hitler’s demands rather than 
risk war. Every instance of Western appeasement to Hitler was a crack in the foundation of the 
Poles’ foreign policy.  
The outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, revealed how the Poles’ 
inter-war efforts to establish themselves within the “concert of Europe” failed. Used by the 
Western Allies and the Soviets alike to buy time for their own inevitable conflict with Hitler, the 
inauguration of the conflict proved the beginning of the end for the Second Republic. The new 
Polish Government-in-Exile was formed primarily from the pre-war opposition to Sanacja, who, 
while claiming to represent the original government of the Second Republic, were a break with 
the regime that Pilsudski had instituted in 1926. Therefore their actions during the war embodied 
an attempt to legitimize their claims by lending all the support at their disposal to the Allied 
cause.  Half a million Polish servicemen fought and died to ensure Poland’s survival after the 
defeat of the Nazi Germany. Yet, the Poles’ sacrifices were undermined in one fell swoop by the 
entry of the Soviet Union into the Allied war effort in June 1941. In comparison with the strength 
of the Red Army, all of the Poles’ contributions shrank into obscurity.  
Yet above all else, Stalin’s demands proved a death sentence to the Second Republic. 
From the beginning of the war, Stalin’s goal had been the annexation of Polish territory, be it 
through an agreement with Hitler, the Western Allies, or by brute force. As the conflict dragged 
on, his aim changed to the total political control of not only Poland, but the whole of Eastern 
Europe. Stalin’s actions, his murder of the Polish officer corps at Katyn, his obstinacy in the 
forming of the Polish II Corps, his creation of the Lublin Committee, and his complacency in the 
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failure of the Warsaw Uprising all offer clear evidence that in the latter half of the conflict, the 
USSR was striving for control of Poland and all of Eastern Europe in the post-war world.  The 
Polish Government-in-Exile’s resistance to Stalin’s plans engendered resentment on the part of 
the Western Allies, desperate for Soviet aid against the Germans, causing them to see the 
London Poles as inconvenient and obstinate. Stalin in the negotiations at the Tehran, Yalta, and 
Potsdam conferences demanded concessions from the Poles and the Western Allies unilaterally 
granted them. When the time came, they were willing to sacrifice the London Poles to appease 
Stalin and ensure his continued pledge to inter-allied Unity and the armed struggle to defeat 
Nazism.  
The government-in-exile, still grappled with the problem of legitimacy inherited from its 
pre-war predecessors. Its continued inability to establish itself with the current framework 
allowed the West to come-to-terms with transferring legitimacy, along with the Polish nation, 
from the London Poles to Stalin’s Committee of National Unity. Despite the fact that Polish 
soldiers, sailors, and airmen had been instrumental in the Allies’ success, by war’s end Stalin had 
achieved his goal of a Poland which took its orders from Moscow. By this means, Poland had 
finally found its “legitimate” place on the European stage, though not at the hands of the Second 
Republic. Rather, for the next half century, the position of the People’s Republic of Poland 
would be defined by an alliance with the USSR and a place within the Soviet sphere.  
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